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I. OVERVIEW
Acts of terrorism on American soil2 and the public's desire
for safety and security prompted Congress to enact several ma-
jor changes to immigration laws. Notably, on April 24, 1996,
Congress enacted the Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 3 and on September 30, 1996, President
1 In the Matter of Pearson, EOIR Case No. A: 72-472-870 (U.S.I.C. Mar. 27,
1997) [hereinafter Pearson] (unpublished opinion, on file with the Pace
International Law Review).
2 Acts of terrorism cited in legislative discussion include the World Trade
Center bombing in 1993, and the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City
in 1995. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-518, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996).
3 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C., including sections 8, 15, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42, 50) [hereinafter AEDPA]. One
week after Congress enacted the AEDPA, the Senate voted to amend certain provi-
sions in the AEDPA, including the expedited procedures for removing undocu-
mented aliens seeking entry into the United States. See Senate Votes to Amend
Terrorism Bill, Criminal Aliens Feel Impact, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 650 (1996)
(cited in Paul S. Jones, Immigration Reform: Congress Expedites Illegal Alien Re-
moval and Eliminates Judicial Review from the Exclusion Process, 21 NOVA L.
REV. 915, 916 (1997)). Ultimately, the legislature struck a compromise which
1
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Clinton signed into law the Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migration Responsibility Act.4 These changes and their effects
on the practice of immigration law have been addressed thor-
oughly in other law review articles. 5
closely resembled the original version of the AEDPA. See Clinton Vows Veto of
Immigration Bill if Gallegly Amendment is Included, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1111, 1112 (1996). In its final result, the AEDPA modified the crime-related de-
portation grounds and procedures of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")
regarding alleged alien terrorists. See Carol Leslie Wolchok, Demands and Anxi-
ety: The Effects of the New Immigration Law, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 12 (1997). The
AEDPA amends the INA with respect to its treatment of alien terrorists and is a
law aimed at preventing and punishing acts of terrorism. See Christine Hsieh,
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 760
(1996).
In the AEDPA, Congress voted to have the provision barring asylum to ter-
rorists apply to applications made on, after and before the date of enactment. Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). For comprehensive and informative analy-
sis regarding the retroactive nature of this Act and the issue of ex post facto law,
see Anjali Parekh Prakash, Note, Changing the Rules, Arguing Against Retroactive
Application of Deportation Statutes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (1997); Michael
Scaperlanda, Are We that Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret Deportation Proceed-
ings, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23 (1996).
4 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IIRAIRA]. The IIRAIRA is Division C of the Defense
Department Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat 3009
(1996). The IIRAIRA effected a major overhaul of the INA, particularly concerning
matters of admission or other entry, exclusion and deportation, discretionary relief
from exclusion or deportation, and judicial review. See infra note 6 regarding the
definition of deportable and excludable aliens. Under the past system of illegal
alien removal, aliens who entered the country unlawfully were afforded greater
constitutional rights in their removal than aliens who had presented themselves to
the proper immigration authorities for entry and had their admission request de-
nied or delayed. See 3A Am. JuR. 2D, ALIENS AND CITIZENS §§ 1135, 1149 (1986).
But see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(b) (1994). For further information see Paul S.
Jones, Immigration Reform: Congress Expedites Illegal Alien Removal and Elimi-
nates Judicial Review from the Exclusion Process, 21 NOVA L. REV. 915, 917-919
(1997); Dulce Foster, Note, Judge, Jury and Executioner: Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service Summary Exclusionary Power Under the IIRAIRA of 1996, 82
MINN. L. REV. 209 (1997); Mark Reiko Osaka, New Limits Placed on Judicial Re-
view of Administrative Orders Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1 HAw.
B.J. 12 (1997); Ellen G. Yost, Immigration and Nationality Act, 31 INT'L. LAw 589
(1997).
5 See supra note 3. For more information addressing these changes in immi-
gration laws and the practice of immigration law, see Wolchok, supra note 3;
Thomas Martin, Note, The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 20
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 201, 205 (1996).
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This Note will focus on the application of these changes in a
recent deportation case in which requested asylum 6 was
granted by the Immigration Court of New York, In the Matter of
Pearson, seemingly in contravention of Congressional intent in
enacting these statutory provisions. Section II of this Note pro-
vides the background of applicable law, procedures, statutory
bars, and exceptions regarding claims for asylum. This will
help the reader understand what a claim of asylum requires
and thus, better understand what transpired in Pearson. Sec-
tion III provides the background facts and circumstances of
Pearson. Section IV provides an alternative analysis of the rele-
vant law and legal principles as applied by the court in Pearson.
Section V discusses the partisan politics and political pressures
playing a role in this case. Section VI addresses the political
and legal ramifications of the Pearson decision. Finally, section
VII concludes with a summary of the possible significance of the
Pearson interpretation of the changes in immigration law.
II. ASYLUM CLAIMS
To qualify for asylum an alien must first demonstrate that
he or she fits within the Immigration and Nationality Act 7 deft-
6 The rights of aliens vary according to their status under the INA. See Jean
v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1464 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 469 U.S. 1071, affd,
472 U.S. 846 (1984). Based on an alien's entry status there are two categories of
aliens: deportable or excludable. If an alien had entered the United States, legally
or otherwise, and upon a finding by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS" or "Service") of statutory reasons for the alien's removal from this country,
the alien was deportable and required a more extensive procedural course for re-
moval. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). Aliens who had not yet entered the United
States and met the statutory requirements for removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 were
excludable and were thus afforded less procedural due process rights. See Jean,
71 F.2d at 1467.
An alien may apply for asylum either affirmatively or defensively. Maureen
0. Jurley, The Asylum Process: Past, Present, and Future, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV.
995, 1013 (1992). Asylum is affirmatively sought when an alien files the claim
before the government is aware the applicant is in the United States illegally. See
id. at 1013. A defensive claim of asylum is filed as a defense to deportation or
exclusion charges. See id. Pearson's claim for asylum was in defense of the gov-
ernment seeking his deportation. See Pearson, at 2-3.
7 Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.
(1952). The 1952 Act (also known as the McCarran-Walter Act) recodified existing
immigration law into one comprehensive statute. There have been numerous
amendments of the basic statute since its enactment in 1952. The INA with its
subsequently adopted amendments and modifications, by the AEDPA and the
IIRAIRA, to name two of the many acts, agreements and amendments, constitutes
3
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nition of a "refugee."8 The definition of "refugee" contains three
broad elements, which must be satisfied before an alien is eligi-
ble for asylum. The alien must 1) generally seek asylum from
outside his or her country of nationality; 9 2) demonstrate in-
ability or unwillingness to return to, and inability or unwilling-
ness to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her
country of nationality because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution; 10 and 3) such persecution must be based on
the main body of United States immigration law. This Note will cite to the Act as
it exists as of October 1998, incorporating all amendments and modifications, and
thus, with no reference to year.
8 See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994). See also 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13 (1998).
9 To apply for asylum, aliens must be physically present in the United
States. INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994). An applicant who has been in
the United States for more than a year is ineligible for asylum unless there are
special circumstances that prevented him or her from applying earlier. See INA
§ 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1996). An exception to the one-
year time limit is if the alien can show "extraordinary circumstances." See id. at
§ 208(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
10 Asylum applicants must demonstrate a "credible fear" to establish well-
founded fear of persecution. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(1994). The Service has refused to define a "credible fear of persecution" in its
implementing regulations. See 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,317 (1997) (supplementary
information). The INA does not define "persecution," but case law has defined per-
secution as harm or suffering inflicted upon an individual by the government of a
country or by persons the government is unable or unwilling to control in order to
punish him for possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor finds offensive and
seeks to overcome. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985).
See also INS v. Stevic, 467 US 497 (1984). In order to meet the well-founded fear
standard of likeliness that the alien will become the victim of persecution, "the
evidence must demonstrate that: 1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a
persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; 2) the
persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, that the alien possess
this belief or characteristic; 3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing the
alien; and 4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien." Acosta, 19 I.
& N. Dec. at 226. "The issue of whether an alien's facts demonstrate these four
factors is one that must be decided on a case-by-case basis depends upon each
alien's own particular situation." Id. at 227.
An alien's state of mind, supported by prevailing conditions in his home coun-
try, will indicate whether he reasonably fears persecution. See INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987). Both subjective and objective evidence must be
considered to determine if a well-founded fear exists. See id. See also Blanco-
Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 1987). The subjective "fear" ele-
ment of the refugee definition is closely linked to the applicant's personality and
credibility. See UNHCR HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMIN-
ING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (Geneva 1979) 37, 40, 41 [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
See also Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984). Fear is not
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/5
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the alien's race, religion, nationality, political opinion or mem-
bership in a particular social group.1 ' The asylum applicant
carries the burden of establishing that a "reasonable person in
his circumstances would fear persecution." 12
Changes to immigration law now include three statutory
bars to aliens seeking asylum, namely aliens are ineligible if
they are found to have: 1) participated in the "persecution of
others,"' 3 2) committed aggravated felonies,' 4 or crimes of
necessarily based on an individual's own experience of persecution but may stem
from the harsh treatment of other similarly situated persons. See HANDBOOK 43.
See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(i) (1998). Evidence of general country conditions is
not in itself sufficient and should be augmented with evidence relating to the appli-
cant's personal plight whenever possible. See Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562,
564-65 (9th Cir. 1984).
11 See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994). See also HANDBOOK,
supra note 11, 57. Often an asylum seeker may experience persecution on sev-
eral of these grounds, or the grounds may overlap. See HANDBOOK, supra note 11,
67.
12 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(a) (1998). See also Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec.
439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987). As an applicant may have difficulty in obtaining cor-
roborating evidence, his testimony alone is acceptable if it "is believable, consis-
tent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the
basis for his fear." Mogharabbi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 445. However, regarding gen-
eral practices in the home country, the asylum applicant must produce supporting
evidence to the extent that it is available. See Matter of Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120
(B.I.A. 1989). Careful consideration should be given to the target country's record
of persecuting others; "a well-founded fear, in other words .. .can be based on
what happens to others who are similarly situated." Mogharabbi, 19 I. & N. Dec.
at 446.
13 INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (1994). "The term 'refugee'
does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise partici-
pated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." (emphasis added).
14 See INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (1994), as amended by
IIRAIRA § 321(a)(3) (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (Supp. II 1996). An aggra-
vated felony is defined to include "a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of
title 18, United States Code, but not including a purely political offense) for which
the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (Supp.
II 1996) (emphasis added). "The term [aggravated felony] applies to an offense...
whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in viola-
tion of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was com-
pleted within the previous 15 years." INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
(1994). The new definition of the term applies to convictions entered "before, on, or
at the date of enactment." Id., as amended by IIRAIRA § 321(b) (1996), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added). See also In re Yeung, Int. Dec.
3297 (B.I.A. 1996). The IIRAIRA definition further limited the definition in the
AEDPA, § 440(e) (1996), enacted only several months before IIRAIRA, (also
amending INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994)). The AEDPA defined
aggravated felonies to include "murder, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, money
5
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moral turpitude, 15 or 3) committed acts of terrorism. 16 Con-
gress enacted these statutory bars to make clear their intention
laundering, or any crime of violence when the sentence is at least one year."
AEDPA, § 440(e) (1996), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276-8 (1996) (emphasis added). The lan-
guage in IIRAIRA, which amended both the INA and AEDPA definitions, indicated
that the definition would apply to "actions taken on or after the date of enactment
of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred.. . ." IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 321(c) (1996), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-627 (1996)(amending INA
§ 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994) as amended by AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, § 441(e) (1996)) (emphasis added). The IIRAIRA definition would bring the
Respondent within this new definition of an aggravated felon, only if "actions
taken" is interpreted as meaning the initiation of deportation proceedings.
An alien may also face disqualification if "there are serious reasons for consid-
ering" that the alien has committed a serious non-political crime prior to entering
the United States. See INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (Supp.
II 1996). While the statute does not define "serious nonpolitical crime," the United
Nations construct defines a "serious crime" as a "capital crime or a very grave pun-
ishable act." See HANDBOOK, supra note 11, 155. For an act to be political, it
must be closely connected to a political purpose. See McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d
591, 595 (9th Cir. 1986). See also HANDBOOK, supra note 11, 152. It must be
more of a political act than a common law crime. See McMullen, 788 F.2d. at 596.
The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "Board") has held that "in evaluating
the political nature of a crime, we consider it important that the political aspect of
the offense outweigh its common-law character. This would not be the case if the
crime is grossly out of proportion to the political objective or if it involves acts of an
atrocious nature." Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 97-98 (B.I.A. 1984)
(former PIRA terrorist barred asylum as the BIA found "serious reason" for con-
cluding his participation in campaign of violence "randomly directed against civil-
ians represents acts of an atrocious nature out of proportion to the political goal of
achieving a unified Ireland"). For further information see Cecelia M. Espenoza,
Crimes of Violence by Non-Citizens and the Immigration Consequences, 26 COLO.
LAw. 89 (1997).
15 See INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1994), as
amended by IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-598 (1996), transferred
to INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. II 1996). An alien is de-
portable as having been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude if, among other
requirements, he "is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer
may be imposed." INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (Supp. II
1996).
16 See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1558 (Supp. II 1996) (rewritten in its
entirety by IIRAIRA § 604, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)). Acts of terrorism are defined in
INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (Supp. II 1996). Actual statutory lan-
guage requires an alien to be "a danger to the security of the United States" to be
ineligible for asylum. See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. II 1996).
The sentence concerning terrorists was added by the AEDPA § 413(a) (1996), 110
Stat. 1269 (1996). Only "reasonable grounds" are needed for believing that a dan-
ger to U.S. security exits, not a showing of actual danger. See INA
§ 208(b)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1558(b)(2)(A)(v) (Supp. II 1996). Thus, if an alien is
found to have engaged in terrorist activity he would be ineligible for asylum, un-
less the court, in its discretion, determines that there are not reasonable grounds
for regarding the alien as a danger to the security to the United States. See INA
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/5
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to take a tough stance on terrorism and to keep criminals from
immigrating to the United States.17 However, there are excep-
tions to these statutory bars. An exception to the statutory bars
for aggravated felonies and crimes of moral turpitude is the
"political offense" exception, which goes to the political purpose
or motivation behind the crime.18 An exception to the statutory
bar for terrorist activity is a waiver contained in the language
added by the AEDPA, namely if the court finds no reasonable
grounds to regard the Respondent as a danger to the security of
the United States. 19
An application for asylum is also deemed to constitute an
application for withholding of deportation. 20 The applicant for
asylum and withholding of deportation has the burden of proof
of establishing he/she has been subject to past persecution,21
has a well-founded fear of persecution, or has established a
§ 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1558(a) (Supp. II 1996), as amended by AEDPA § 421(a)
(1996).
17 See In re Yeung, Int. Dec. 3297 (B.I.A. 1996).
18 See INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (1994) (aggravated fel-
ony) and INA § 237 (a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227 (a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. II 1996) (moral
turpitude). Criminal prosecution is not persecution. See Matter of Janus and
Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 876 (B.I.A. 1968). The political offenses exception doc-
trine, derived from extradition law, states generally that a person may not be ex-
tradited to face prosecution in the requesting state for crimes committed in
furtherance of a political uprising, movement or rebellion. See Ornelas v. Ruiz,
161 U.S. 502 (1896). See also supra note 15 for information regarding the political
nature of a crime.
19 See INA § 208(b)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv) (Supp. II 1996).
20 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1998). Withholding of deportation is now also
known as withholding of removal. Section 305 of the IIRAIRA enacted in 1996
rewrote INA § 243 in its entirety; the provisions of the former 'withholding of de-
portation' can be found in INA § 241. See INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (Supp. II
1996). See also IIRAIRA § 305 (1996). As INA § 243(h) existed prior to April 1,
1997 an application for asylum also constituted an application for asylum. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.3 (1998). After April 1, 1997, it is still "deemed to constitute both at
the same time unless adjudicated in deportation or extradition proceedings com-
menced prior to April 1, 1997." Id.
Note that withholding of deportation (or withholding of removal) is only a dif-
ferent form of relief, and grants no status to the individual requesting it.
21 An alien who has demonstrated past persecution is presumed to have a
well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (1998). Well-
founded fear of persecution is presumed unless it is demonstrated by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that, since the time the persecution occurred, conditions in the
applicant's country have changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer
has a well-founded fear. Id. See also INA § 208(a)(2)D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D)
(Supp. II 1996). The Service has the burden to rebut the presumption. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (1998). See also In re H-, Int. Dec. 3276 (B.I.A. 1976).
7
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clear probability of persecution. 22 The applicant has the burden
of establishing that he/she merits a favorable exercise of discre-
tion.23 Asylum is a discretionary remedy.2 4 As such, statutory
and regulatory eligibility for asylum, whether based on past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, does
not necessarily compel a grant of asylum.25 Asylum may be de-
nied, if the totality of the circumstances indicate that the ad-
verse factors outweigh the fear of persecution and positive
factors in the asylum application. 26 If, however, asylum is
granted, the asylee can then apply for more permanent types of
status in the United States.27
22 See 8 C.F.R. §208.13(b)(2) (1998). See also Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). One seeking withholding of deportation must demonstrate
that it is "more likely than not" that his life or freedom would be threatened in the
proposed country of deportation on account of his race, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b) (1998).
23 See Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 1987).
24 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987).
25 See id.
26 See Matter of Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99, 107 (B.I.A. 1989). Favorable
factors include the alien's conduct while in this country, whether the individual
has relatives residing in the United States, and humanitarian concerns, such as an
individual's tender years or poor health. See Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 474. A seri-
ous non-political crime outside the United States serves as a negative discretion-
ary factor. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)(iii) (1998); 53 Fed. Reg. 11,301 (Apr. 6, 1988)
(emphasis added). Another adverse factor is if the alien engaged in fraud to cir-
cumvent orderly refugee procedures, however, the seriousness of the fraud is con-
sidered. See Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 474.
In determining whether an alien should be granted asylum when the alien has
a serious criminal conviction, the court weighs the gravity of the crime against the
persecution facing the alien if returned to his or her country of nationality. See
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, 156-58. If the persecution is found to be severe, then
the alien should be found ineligible for asylum only if the crime was very grave.
See id. at 156. See also Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 473-74; Arthur C. Helton, Crite-
ria and Procedures for Refugee Protection in the United States, 964 PLICoRP. 21,
34 (1996).
27 See INA § 209(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (Supp. II 1996). Asylum is a tempo-
rary status granted for a year. See id. "Every alien classified as a refugee [pursu-
ant to 8 C.F.R. §207] whose status has not terminated, must apply to the Service
after one year to determine his or her admissibility." 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a) (1998). A
grant of asylum does not convey a right to remain permanently in the United
States, and such may be revoked under certain circumstances. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(c)(2) (Supp. II 1996). After refugee status is approved, the asylee refugee
"shall, at the end of such year period, return or be returned to the custody of the
Service for inspection and examination for admission... (and] if found to be ad-
missible .. .as an immigrant ... shall be regarded as lawfully admitted to the
United States for permanent residence as of the date of such alien's arrival into the
United States." INA § 209(a)(1), (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1), (2) (Supp. II 1996). One
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/5
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III. IN THE MATTER OF PEARSON
Pearson is a recent case decided by the Immigration Court
of New York on March 27, 1997. The Respondent, Brian Pear-
son, a native of Northern Ireland and citizen of the United
Kingdom, entered the United States through New York City's
John F. Kennedy International Airport on October 3, 1988,
under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. 28 He had just been re-
leased from Long Kesh Prison 29 in August,30 having served 12
years of a 25 year sentence for driving the getaway car3 l follow-
type of permanent status which could then be applied for is Adjustment of Status,
under INA § 245(a), such as the Respondent requested in his original application
to the Service. See Pearson, at 2. If after the year waiting period the country to
which the asylee was to be deported becomes safe, asylum can be withdrawn. See
INA § 208(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (Supp. II 1996). If the applicant never
applied for Adjustment of Status during the year waiting period following the
grant of asylum, he could at that time be deported. See INA § 209(b)(2), 8 U.S.C.
1159(a)(1)(B) (1994).
28 See Pearson, at 2. The Visa Waiver Pilot Program [hereinafter VWPPI en-
ables individuals from certain countries to visit the U.S. for up to 90 days. See INA
§ 217, 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (1994), as amended by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-649, § 201(a), 104 Stat. 4978; Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration
and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-232, §§ 303(a), 307(1)(3),
105 Stat. 1773. Individuals seeking entry as tourists under the VWPP are waived
the requirement that they first obtain a non-immigrant visa of some form. See
INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (1994). See also INA § 212(a)(7)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7) (Supp. II 1996). In return for the waiver of this requirement, the indi-
vidual waives any right to contest excludability or deportability, excepting claims
for asylum. See INA § 217(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1187 (b)(2)(1994). The "pilot program
period means the period beginning on October 1, 1988 and ending on April 30,
1998." INA § 217(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (1994).
The Respondent entered the U.S. on October 3, 1988, within the pilot program
period. See Pearson, at 2. He was authorized to remain in the U.S. only until
January 21, 1989. See id.
29 Renamed, Maze Prison, it is located near Belfast, Northern Ireland. See
infra note 176.
30 Pearson's actual date of release was August 23, 1988. See Pearson, at 27.
31 Respondent was duly convicted by the Crown Court in Northern Ireland on
April 19, 1977 on several criminal charges related to two separate Irish Republican
Army ("IRA") bombings of Royal Ulster Constabulary ("RUC") barracks; one on
October 18, 1975, the other on December 27, 1995. See id. In total, Pearson was
convicted of ten separate crimes, relating to explosive substances, the possession of
explosive substances, the hijacking of a car, the unlawful possession of a rifle, and
membership in a proscribed organization, namely the IRA. See id. As a result of
these convictions, Pearson was sentenced to numerous terms of imprisonment,
ranging from 5 to 25 years, all to be served concurrently. See id. at 27.
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ing two Irish Republican Army ("IRA") bombings of Royal
Ulster Constabulary ("RUC") barracks. 32
Pearson had authorization to remain in the U.S. only until
January 21, 1989. 33 However, Pearson remained in the U.S.
long past that authorized date, during which time he married a
U.S. citizen, Doris Pearson,34 and had a child. 35 As the immedi-
ate relative of a U.S. citizen, Pearson applied for Adjustment of
Status 36 on May 17, 1995.3 7 At an appointment with the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service ("INS" or "Service") on
April 9, 1996, the Respondent was served with the Service's de-
cision denying his adjustment application. 38 Simultaneously,
Pearson was served with an Order to Show Cause39 charging
32 See Pearson, at 27, 34, 35. In Northern Ireland, the RUC is Northern Ire-
land's official police force. See Jonathan Stevenson, The IRA Doesn't Deserve Asy-
lum, WALL ST. J. EUR., May 21, 1997, at 8. RUC barracks are not only the police
station where residents come to address complaints and where suspects would be
brought and detained; the RUC Constables often reside in these barracks as well.
RUC barracks and police forces have been favored targets of the IRA. Destroying
the barracks not only puts a halt to police business, it effectively renders the facili-
ties uninhabitable. Furthermore, because a Constable "wears the uniform of the
Crown there is always the military justification for the killing." See PADRAIG
O'MALLEY, THE UNCVIL WARS: IRELAND TODAY, 290-91 (1983). Pearson acknowl-
edged this view in his testimony as he stated that "the RUC Barracks is the em-
bodiment of British rule, and represents the very thing the Republicans seek to rid
themselves of." Pearson, at 33-34.
33 See Pearson, at 2.
34 See id. at 16.
35 See id. at 16.
36 See 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(e) (1998). See generally INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255
(1994) for adjustment of status. A waiver of rights under the VWPP generally
includes all non-asylum forms of relief. See VWPP, supra note 28. However, an
individual admitted as a visitor under the VWPP is not eligible to apply for adjust-
ment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident alien pursuant to INA
§ 245A(b), other than as an immediate relative as defined in INA § 201(b) or under
the provisions of INA § 245(i). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.1(b), 245.1(b)(8) (1998). Thus,
the only way an alien entering under the VWPP can adjust his status is as the
immediate relative of a U.S. citizen.
37 See Pearson, at 2.
38 See id. The Service denied Respondent's adjustment of status application
because the ground of excludability contained in INA § 212(a) applied to the Re-
spondent, namely, that because of his activities in Northern Ireland he had en-
gaged in terrorist activity, as defined in INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B) (1994). See Pearson, at 8.
39 See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.14, .15 (1998) [hereinafter OSCI. If an alien ad-
mitted under the VWPP requests asylum, the subsequent proceedings against him
must commence with an OSC. See 8 C.F.R. § 217(b) (1998); Matter of L-, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 553, 554 (B.I.A. 1992). Deportation proceedings are commenced with the issu-
ance of an OSC, which may only be issued by the Service. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.14
616
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him with deportation. 40 The Service charged Pearson with de-
portation, not only because he had over-stayed the original
VWPP's terms41 and was an excludable alien at the time of en-
try,42 but more significantly, because the Service alleged he was
an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.43
Therefore, Pearson was precluded from remaining in the United
States.
In response to the OSC and its attempt to establish de-
portability, 44 Pearson again claimed Adjustment of Status45
based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen.46 Pearson also raised
(1998). Authority to deport/remove aliens under the INA is granted to the Attor-
ney General. See INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. II 1996). In deportation pro-
ceedings, the Service, through its subordinate immigration officers and officials,
bears the burden of proving by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence that the
alien it wishes to remove is deportable. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286
(1966).
40 See Pearson, at 2.
41 See generally INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (Supp. II 1996) (permits deporting
aliens who have remained in this country for a time longer than permitted).
42 The respondent, at the time of entry into the U.S. was not in possession of a
valid immigration visa. See generally INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. II 1996).
Note that the 1996 legislative amendments to the INA substituted language of "is
inadmissible" for "is excludable." IIRAIRA § 308(d)(1)(B), (C) (1996).
43 See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. II 1996).
44 See Pearson, at 2. At the master calendar hearing held on August 2, 1996,
the Respondent conceded proper service of the OSC and admitted allegations re-
garding nationality, entering under the VWPP, that he had remained longer than
the time permitted and that he did not then possess a valid immigrant visa. See
id. The respondent, however, denied all charges of deportability. See id.
45 See id. at 7. To be eligible for adjustment of status, which grants perma-
nent residency status, the alien must show he was inspected and admitted or pa-
roled into the United States; he is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is
admissible for permanent residence; and that an immigrant visa is immediately
available at the time the application is filed. See INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255
(1994). Even if the alien meets this criteria, the application may be denied in the
discretion of the court. See Matter of Lam, 16 I. & N. Dec. 432, 434 (B.I.A. 1978).
See also INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (Supp. II 1996). The exercise of discretion
involves the weighing of favorable and adverse factors in a particular case. See
Lam, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 434.
46 The most important favorable factor in the exercise of discretion regarding
adjustment of status is that the alien is a relative of a United States citizen. See
Matter of Ibrahim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 55 (B.I.A. 1981). "Other favorable factors in-
clude family ties to the United States; lengthy residence in the United States, an
approved preference petition, hardship if the Respondent were forced to apply for
an immigrant visa through consular processing, payment of taxes, community ser-
vice, good moral character, employment history and business and property ties to
the United States." Pearson, at 8 (citing Matter of Blas, 15 I. & N. Dec. 626 (A.G.
1976)). A range of positive and adverse factors includes "age, family ties and
11
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the claim of asylum,47 based on his political beliefs. 48  He fur-
length of residence in this country, immigration or criminal violations, the inter-
ests of society, and the hardship of removal." See In re Michel, Int. Dec. 3335
(B.I.A. 1998) (citing Matter of Mendez, Int. Dec. 3272 (B.I.A. 1996)). Even if an
alien's criminal conviction may not be a statutory bar, it "may properly be a factor
to be considered in the exercise of discretion." Id. Another adverse factor is the
circumventing of orderly refugee procedures. See Matter of Soleimani, Int. Dec.
3118 (B.I.A. 1989).
47 See Pearson, at 2. An individual may apply for asylum to an asylum officer
or an immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a) (1998). However, when an alien
applies for asylum in the course of deportation hearings the immigration judge has
jurisdiction over the asylum application. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2(b), 3.14(b) (1998).
Pearson also argued for alternative relief of suspension of deportation and volun-
tary departure, but the court determined these forms of relief were contrary to
what Congress intended under the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Pearson,
at 2-3. See generally Helton, Criteria and Procedures for Refugee Protection in the
United States, 964 PLI/CoRP. 21 (1996)(for further information on the procedural
process of applying for asylum).
The applicant's burden of proof of establishing the likelihood of persecution is
a "lesser burden of proof [and] ... is less stringent than the 'clear and convincing
evidence' standard which the government must meet to establish that the alien is
not legally present in the United States." Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d
1277, 1281 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985). The BIA has held that the applicant's burden is to
establish the likelihood of persecution by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (1998) ("more
likely than not" burden). See also supra notes 21-25, and accompanying text.
48 See Pearson, at 32. The Respondent, a Catholic, testified to the discrimina-
tion he and his family experienced in Ireland, which he asserts was on account of
their religion, and the political beliefs which were attached to Catholics, namely
the desire to expel the British and reunite Northern Ireland with the Republic of
Ireland. See id. Thus, the Respondent's political beliefs are for reunification of
Ireland.
In 1921-22 Ireland a country comprised of 32 counties was divided into two
parts. See id. at 18. The southern 26 counties became the Republic of Ireland,
which is independent of British rule, having its own Parliament and governmental
structure. See id. The 6 northern counties became known as Northern Ireland
and remained part of the United Kingdom. See id. at 18. Both Irish Catholics and
English Protestants live in Northern Ireland, but in a state of discord as most
Catholics there are Republicans who wish to rid Northern Ireland of British rule
and most Protestants are Loyalists who want Northern Ireland to remain part of
the United Kingdom. See Pearson, at 18. The Irish Republican Army originated in
1916 with its goal being to remove British presence from all of Ireland. See id. at
24. Thus, the IRA has targeted British forces, places and people, in its attempts to
drive the British out of Ireland. See id. British forces in Northern Ireland, includ-
ing the RUC are often the targets of violence by those who strive to re-unify Ire-
land, free of British rule. See id. The IRA has a general headquarters, with an
army council, and orders are given and obeyed like in an army. See id. at 24.
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ther requested withholding of deportation, 49 suspension of de-
portation,50 and, in the alternative, voluntary departure. 51
On November 18, 1996, the Service filed a superceding
OSC.52 While the second OSC closely mirrored the original, it
included several additional factual allegations, and two addi-
49 See Pearson, at 2. Pearson declined to designate a country of deportation.
See id. at 5. As at least one country must be designated if deportation is deemed
necessary, the Service designated the Republic of Ireland as the country of depor-
tation, with the United Kingdom as in the alternative. See id. at 5-6. Pearson
specifically requested withholding of deportation to the United Kingdom and to the
Republic of Ireland as indicated in the Service's OSC. See id. at 2-3.
50 See Pearson, at 3. Suspension of deportation, INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1254
(1994), was repealed by IIRAIRA § 308(b)(7) (1996). Cancellation of removal
(withholding of deportation) is provided by INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (Supp. II
1996) as redesignated by IIRAIRA § 308(b) (1996). In order to establish statutory
eligibility, "aliens must prove they have been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of at least 7 years, that they have been persons of
good moral character during such period, and that their deportation would result
in extreme hardship to themselves or to their spouse, parent, or child who is a
citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States." In re Pilch, Int. Dec.
3298 (B.I.A. 1996). "Extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexi-
ble meaning, and the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon
the facts and circumstances of each case." Id. The Board has determined the fol-
lowing factors to be relevant to the issue:
the length of the alien's presence over the minimum requirement of 7
years; the alien's age, both at entry and at the time of application for re-
lief; the presence of lawful permanent resident or United States citizen
family ties to this country; the alien's family ties outside the United
States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the alien is
returnable and the extent of the alien's ties to such countries; the finan-
cial impact of departure from this country; significant conditions of
health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical
care in the country to which the alien will return; and lastly, the possibil-
ity of other means of adjustment of status or future entry into this
country.
Mendez, Int. Dec. 3298 (citing Matter of Anderson, 16 I. & N. Dec. 596 (B.I.A.
1978).
Note that cancellation of removal now calls for "exceptional and unusual hard-
ship." See INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (Supp. II 1996).
51 See Pearson, at 2-3. Under voluntary departure, Pearson would, on his own
volition, leave the United States. See INA § 244(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c) (Supp. II
1996).
52 See Pearson, at 3. The effect of a superceding OSC is that it cancels the
originally filed OSC and substitutes the superceding OSC in its place. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 240.20(e) (1998). The Service argued it had the right to file additional factual
allegations and grounds of deportation at any time. See Pearson, at 3. See also
8 C.F.R. § 240.10(e) (1998).
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tional charges of deportability. 3 While the court ultimately did
not allow the superceding OSC to replace or supplant the origi-
nal OSC, 54 it decided to treat the superceding OSC document
as a Notice of Lodging Additional Charges by which to amend
the originally filed OSC. 55 Thus, these additional charges of de-
portability, namely, as an alien excludable at the time of en-
53 See Pearson, at 3. The additional allegations within the superceding OSC
"charged the Respondent with deportability, . . . as an alien excludable at the time
of entry,... as an alien convicted of two or more offenses (other than purely polit-
ical offenses) for which the aggregate sentences to confinement actually imposed
was more than five years, otherwise known as crimes of moral turpitude, and...
as an alien who has engaged in terrorist activity ...." Id.
54 See Pearson, at 4. Originally, the court had accepted the superceding OSC
over the objections of the Respondent. See id. at 3. The respondent objected to the
submission of the document, but did acknowledge "receipt" of the superceding
OSC. See id. Upon motion from the Respondent, the court adjourned proceedings
to allow the Respondent an opportunity to review and respond, given that the
hearing date was only two days from the issuance of the superceding OSC. See id.
On January 7, 1997, the court, sua sponte, amended its decision and held that
jurisdiction had become vested in its court, thereby limiting the Service's motion to
cancel the originally filed OSC. See Pearson, at 3. See also 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(c)
(1998). As jurisdiction had vested and proceedings begun, the Service could only
make a motion to cancel the originally filed OSC, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §239.2(a)
(1998), by alleging one of the following: the Respondent is 1) a national of the
United States; 2) not deportable under immigration laws; 3) deceased; 4) not in the
United States; 5) the Respondent failed to file a waiver; or 6) the OSC was not
properly served. See Pearson, at 3. See also 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a) (1998) (additional
provisions, added since the Pearson decision, provide for alleging changed circum-
stances in the case or that an issuing officer can cancel the notice to appear under
(2) or (6) unless impracticable). The Service did not make such a motion, and it
was not able to allege any of the required reasons for canceling a previously filed
OSC. See Pearson, at 3-4. The court noted that "the case law the Service cites in
support of its argument [to supercede the OSCI is inclusive as to whether the Ser-
vice may file a 'superceding OSC' without first establishing a defect in the original
OSC." Id. at 4. The court held there was no flaw in the April 9, 1996 OSC. See id.
Thus, the court did not allow the Service to file a "superceding" OSC. See id.
55 See id.
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try,5 6 and as an alien who has engaged in terrorist activity, 57
were included as part of the originally filed OSC.58
The court found the Respondent was deportable from the
U.S. because of his overstay of the VWPP.5 9 Although the Ser-
vice requested the court make a finding as to all of the charges
of deportability against the Respondent, the court then deter-
mined to hold a full merits hearing in which testimony and
other evidence could be presented to make a finding as to all of
the charges of deportability and forms of possible relief from de-
portation, if applicable. 60 Ultimately, the court determined that
56 See Pearson, at 3. See also INA § 212(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. II
1996).
57 The importance of this superceding OSC becomes apparent in examining
the language in IIRAIRA § 321 (1996) regarding the definition of aggravated fel-
ony. Section 321(a) indicates that "notwithstanding any other provision of law [in-
cluding any effective date], the term applies regardless of whether the conviction
was entered before, on, or after the date of enactment of this paragraph." IIRAIRA
§ 321(a) (1996). While that sentence would bring the Respondent within the defi-
nition of aggravated felony, Judge Williams stressed that section 321(c) of
IIRAIRA indicates that "[tihe amendments [to the aggravated felony definition]
shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regard-
less of when the conviction occurred . . . ." Pearson, at 11 (quoting IIRAIRA
§ 321(c) (1996)). Thus, the court held that the new aggravated felony definition did
not apply to the Respondent as the original OSC was filed on April 9, 1996,
whereas IIRAIRA was enacted on September 30, 1996. See id. Had the court ac-
cepted the Service's definition of "action" as that used in a traditional civil proceed-
ing, then the Service would have effectively re-initiated deportation proceedings on
the date the superceding OSC was filed, November 18,1996, and thus fall within
IIRAIRA definition adopted on September 30, 1996. Judge Williams even hypothe-
sized that this was what the Service had attempted by filing the superceding OSC.
See Pearson, at 11. However, as Judge Williams did not allow the additional
charges to constitute a superceding OSC, that argument was rendered moot. See
id. The Board of Immigration Appeals specifically held that the new definition of
the term applies to convictions entered on, before or after the date of enactment.
See Yeung, Int. Dec. at 3297. As the Respondent's case was still pending before
the court on the date of enactment, September 30, 1996, Judge Williams held the
new definition of aggravated felonies applied to the Respondent. See Pearson, at
27.
58 See Pearson, at 4.
59 See id. at 5. The Respondent had admitted to staying in the U.S. for a time
longer than permitted under VWPP, and documentation established his entry and
failure to timely depart. See id. Thus, the court found Respondent's overstay met
the Woodby standard of clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence. See Pearson,
at 5. See also Woodby, 385 U.S. 276. Also, the Respondent was deemed deportable
as an alien who remained in the U.S. for a time longer than permitted. See Pear-
son, at 5.
60 See Pearson, at 5. First, Judge Williams ruled it would be impossible to
make a determination on all of the charges of deportability filed against the Re-
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the only forms of relief from deportation available 6' to the Re-
spondent were adjustment of status,62 asylum, and withholding
of deportation. 63
The court's finding in Pearson broke new ground in holding
a convicted felon was not statutorily precluded from being
found eligible for asylum under the three main statutory bars.
Although Pearson appeared to fall within each of the three stat-
utory bars, Immigration Judge Williams found that Pearson
qualified as a political refugee. 64 Judge Williams determined
that Pearson, due to his political beliefs, namely, for being a Ro-
man Catholic, supporting Sinn Fein 65 and the unification of
spondent as related to his activities in Northern Ireland until a full hearing on the
merits could be presented with a full assessment of the events which took place.
See id. Without such an assessment, Judge Williams thought it impossible to
make a proper determination of the Respondent's deportability according to the
Woodby standard, and to reach a determination of the Respondent's eligibility for
relief. See Pearson, at 5. The court particularly did not want to incur the great
expenditure of resources and time to bifurcate the proceedings, which would only
have to be repeated if the Respondent were found to be eligible for the forms of
relief requested. See id.
61 The court pretermitted the Respondent's applications for suspension of de-
portation and voluntary departure, in the alternative, due to the "clear and unam-
biguous language of both the Act and the regulations which specifically limit the
forms of relief an individual who entered under the VWPP is entitled to apply for."
Id. at 7. See INA § 217, 8 U.S.C. § 1987 (1994).
62 See Pearson, at 7. See also supra note 45.
63 See Pearson, at 7. See also supra note 20.
64 See Pearson, at 40-42. See supra note 8 regarding "refugee" status. The
Respondent argued his arrest by the RUC in February 1976 and subsequent al-
leged cruel treatment and torture constituted past persecution. See Pearson, at 39.
The court held that while the Respondent may have been mistreated, that did not
equal persecution. See id. Thus, Judge Williams did not find that the Respondent
had been persecuted in the past. See id. See also 8 C.F.R. § 287.6 (1998). More-
over, the Board has held, "mistreatment by authorities in the course of an investi-
gation does not amount to persecution when the purpose of the mistreatment was
to elicit information relating to a militant organization and specific criminal acts,
rather than to persecute the individual on account of a protected ground." Matter
of R-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 621, 625 (B.I.A. 1992). Therefore, the court held it would not
question the process under which the Respondent was convicted, and it accepted
the duly certified Record of Convictions from a foreign sovereign, which indicated
the Respondent's conviction of numerous crimes related to two separate bombings
in Northern Ireland. See Pearson, at 39. Finding the Respondent did not suffer
past persecution, and was therefore ineligible for the statutory presumption of
well-founded fear of future persecution, the court had to determine if the Respon-
dent had a well-founded fear of persecution. See Pearson, at 39. See also INA
§ 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994).
65 Sinn Fein is the political arm of the Irish Republican Army. See Dan Balz,
IRA's Political Arm Renounces Violence, WASH. POST, September 10, 1997, at A15.
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Ireland66 and due to the worldwide notoriety of the case,67 had
a reasonable subjective fear of persecution,68 even if deported to
the Republic of Ireland. 69 Judge Williams further found that
Pearson's acts on behalf of the IRA in Northern Ireland were
"legitimate political violence,"70 and, therefore, bypassed the
66 See Pearson, at 39. The Respondent testified as to his fears for his life or for
convictions on false charges because he is known as an ex-political prisoner and
because he supports Sinn Fein and the unification of Ireland. See id. The Respon-
dent also states he is Catholic and believes this mere fact also forms a basis for his
fear. See id.
67 See id. at 40. The court noted that numerous witnesses testified that the
notoriety the Respondent gained during the course of the proceedings would "un-
doubtedly make him identifiable to numerous opponents if he were to return to any
part of Ireland." Id.
68 See Pearson, at 40. Judge Williams found that the Respondent established
he possessed beliefs and characteristics which Loyalist paramilitary groups, the
RUC and British government, find offensive. See id. As such, the court found that
the Respondent had a "well-founded fear of persecution." Id.
69 See id. at 39-40. The Respondent stated that "Ireland is a small country
and people can and do cross the borders regularly, and that he would not be safe
merely because he was in the Republic of Ireland." Id. at 40.
70 See Pearson, at 36, 40. According to Judge Williams, the phrase "political
offense," as defined in U.S. jurisprudence, is the same as "legitimate political vio-
lence" as defined by the Service's expert witness, Professor Wilkinson. See id. at
36. "Implicit in the understanding of the term [legitimate political offense] is the
belief that there is a contradictory term, referring to 'illegitimate political vio-
lence'; to wit, terrorism." Id. Professor Wilkinson testified that "there are occa-
sions when it is legitimate and reasonable to use violence; to wit, when violence is
the only way to protect civilians." Id. at 32.
Judge Williams held that all of the Respondent's convictions fall within the
political offense exception as that term is contemplated by the various sections of
the INA. See id. at 35. The court determined that the Respondent's participation
in the bombing of the RUC barracks was a 'political offense' as "[t]he attack was in
the context of a conflict and/or insurrection, and was clearly in furtherance of the
objectives of that conflict." Pearson, at 34. Judge Williams held "[tihe attack was
also not out of proportion to the political objective sought nor was it of an atrocious
nature." Id. Of particular emphasis by the Judge was the fact that warnings were
given to avoid personal injuries. See id. Furthermore, Judge Williams stated that
"the target of the attack was a legitimate military target as a combattant [sic] in
the conflict." Id. Also, the Judge reasoned that "[g]overnment property, as op-
posed to 'the indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace' was the target of said
attack... [aiccordingly, the Respondent's offenses relating to that event would be
deemed 'political .... " Id.
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three statutory bars regarding persecution of others,71 aggra-
vated felonies, 72 and terrorist acts. 73
While this decision is from the lowest level Immigration
and Naturalization Service court, and thus, it does not have
precedential value or weight in the strictest sense,74 it is signifi-
71 See Pearson, at 39. Judge Williams found that "neither the Respondent's
mere membership in the IRA, nor his participation in bombing campaigns against
the RUC, constituted 'persecution' within the meaning of the Act." Id. See also
INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (1994). As Judge Williams found no
evidence that the Respondent targeted individuals based on their opposition to the
IRA. See Pearson, at 38. Furthermore, Judge Williams determined that "the Ser-
vice had not established that the Respondent was directly involved or acted in
complicity with an indiscriminate bombing campaign of civilian populations, which
would amount to terrorism, and could arguably be considered 'persecution of
others.'" Id. Judge Williams noted that the Board has specifically held that indis-
criminate bombing campaigns do not, "involve persecution based on political opin-
ion." Id. (citing Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 96 (1984)).
72 See id. at 27-28. The Court found that the aggravated felony definition (as
amended by IIRAIRA § 321(b) (1996)) did apply to the Respondent. See id. at 27.
However, as the Respondent's acts were deemed to fall within the "political of-
fense" exception, the court held he could not be deemed to have been convicted of
an aggravated felony for committing a crime of violence. See Pearson, at 27-28.
73 See id. at 37. In finding the Respondent had not engaged in terrorist activ-
ity, Judge Williams held "the terrorist bar added by the AEDPA was inapplicable."
Id. Judge Williams noted that even if that provision did apply, then he held "the
Respondent fits within the waiver contained therein, as there are no reasonable
grounds for regarding the Respondent as a danger to the security of the United
States." Id. The court determined the Respondent fit within the waiver due to the
numerous character witnesses attesting to his reputation for honesty and integ-
rity. See id. at 37. Judge Williams noted that he listened to testimony, given on
behalf of the Respondent, from "two members of Congress, as well as a New York
State Supreme Court Justice and Assemblyman, and current and former members
of the New York City Police Department attesting that, in their opinion, the Re-
spondent poses no threat to safety or security in this country." Pearson, at 37. To
further substantiate its determination that the waiver would apply to the Respon-
dent, the court noted that "[t]he Respondent has not been involved in any criminal
activity in this country, is married to a United States citizen, has a United States
citizen daughter, owns a home, and pays his taxes." Id.
74 Immigration courts are akin to federal district courts, however the rules of
evidence do not apply in the immigration court. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.12, 3.43(c)
(1998); see also Matter of Wadud, 19 I. & N. 182, 187 (B.I.A. 1984). The broad
scope of the Immigration Court rules of procedure are to "assist in the expeditious,
fair and proper resolution of matters." 8 C.F.R. §3.12 (1998). However, testimony
of witnesses must be under oath or affirmation. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.34 (1998). In
credible fear determinations, evidence must be "material and relevant to any issue
in review." 8 C.F.R. §3.43(c) (1998). Either the alien or the INS may appeal the
decision of the Immigration Judge directly to the Board of Immigration Appeals in
Virginia. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(b), 3.3(a)(1) (1998). The Board, comprised of 15 mem-
bers, can remand a case to the immigration judge with instructions to undertake
appropriate action, or in appropriate cases, grant relief outright. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1
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cant in many ways. Pearson is one of the first cases to address
the issue of asylum and refugee status following the recent
changes in immigration law. Also, it is highly significant as to
how Judge Williams ultimately found the Respondent not to be
within any of the statutory bars. While the judge took great
pains to state that this decision was particular to Pearson and
his circumstances, 75 it seems likely that this court's reasoning
provides a toe hold for other similar cases. 76 Lastly, this deci-
(1998). Decisions of the Board, unless modified or overruled by the Attorney Gen-
eral, are binding on all Immigration Judges and Service officers and employees.
See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1998). Selected decisions voted upon by the permanent
Board may be designated as precedents. See id.
A decision of the BIA resulting in a final order of deportation may be appealed
to the appropriate federal court of appeals for judicial review, and ultimately to the
United States Supreme Court. See INA § 106(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(10) (Supp.
II 1996) as amended by AEDPA § 440(a) (1996) (restricting certain classes of crimi-
nal convictions from judicial review).
An appeal to the BIA may be requested by filing a Notice of Appeal in a timely
fashion directly with the Board in Virginia, together with the filing fee. See 8
C.F.R. § 3.3(a)(1) (1996), as amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900 (Apr. 29, 1996) (filing
notice directly with BIA); 8 C.F.R. § 3.8 (1996), as amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900
(Apr. 29, 1996) (enclosing filing fee). The notice of appeal must include a brief
description of the request based on any questions of fact or conclusions of law at
issue in the case. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.3(b) (1998). Failure to do so may result in sum-
mary dismissal of the appeal. See id., as amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,906
(Apr. 29, 1996).
75 See Pearson, at 36, 42. There are other former IRA members in the U.S.
who applied for adjustment of status under similar, if not identical circumstances,
to that of Pearson and subsequently filed for asylum when the INS moved to de-
port them. See Richard Willing, Ruling Gives Ex-IRA Bomber Hope of an Ameri-
can Dream, USA TODAY, April 14, 1997, at 03A. These five other men are Robert
McErlean, Matthew Morrison, Gabriel Megahey, Noel Gaynor and Gerald Mc-
Dade. See id. The men's stories are similar, in that they are all Irish nationals
who joined the IRA in the 1970s, were later convicted of felonies, committed on
behalf of the IRA, and served sentences in Long Kesh Prison near Belfast, North-
ern Ireland. See id. After being released the men entered the U.S. on the VWPP,
overstayed their time, held down jobs, paid taxes, and stayed out of trouble while
living in the States. See id. Several of them have married U.S. citizen women and
had U.S. citizen children. See Willing, supra. An exception is Gabriel Megahey
who, unlike the others, was convicted in the U.S. and served five years in the U.S.
for attempting to provide weapons to the IRA. See Cassandra Burrell, Administra-
tion Stops Deportation Proceedings To Further Peace Talks, Assoc. PRESS, Septem-
ber 9, 1997.
76 See supra note 75 for other similar cases. See also supra note 74 for infor-
mation about precedent decisions. "In addition to Attorney General and Board de-
cisions referred to in § 3.1(g) ..., designated Service decisions are to serve as
precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue(s)." 8 C.F.R. § 103.33(c)
(1988). "Except as these decisions may be modified or overruled by later precedent
decisions, they are binding on all Service employees ... " Id. As the other cases
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sion lends political legitimacy to the acts of the IRA by finding
that an IRA member should be classified as a legitimate mili-
tary combatant 77 rather than a terrorist, and that the IRA
bombing of RUC barracks constituted a political act,78 not an
act of terrorism. Judge Williams further found the RUC's "atro-
cious acts" 79 against Northern Catholics made the barracks
bombed a "'legitimate target' as that term is considered in inter-
national law and the laws of war."80
Following the trial, Judge Williams ruled that anti-terror-
ism legislation recently passed by Congress,81 which precluded
convicted felons from applying for political asylum, did not ap-
ply to Pearson.8 2 To find the attack a "political offense" the
court considered the nature of the political situation in North-
ern Ireland at the time, as well as the "context, mode, target
and purpose of the attack."8 3 Judge Williams held that "[tihe
attack was also not out of proportion to the political object
sought, nor was it of an atrocious nature. '8 4 Judge Williams
determined that the adverse affect of Pearson's act of driving
the getaway car following two bombings of RUC barracks was
mitigated by the fact that "[siufficient warnings were given to
avoid personal injuries, and the target of the attack was a legiti-
mate military target as a combatant in the conflict."8 5 Further-
more, the court emphasized that the target of the attack was a
involving former IRA men are in different Immigration Courts, the Pearson case
would have only persuasive, not binding authority, unless it was designated to
serve as precedent on the same issue(s). See id. However, the many factual simi-
larities between the cases in combination with Pearson being the first case follow-
ing the major changes in immigration law (the AEDPA and the IIRAIRA), make it
likely that Judge William's analysis and decision would be relied on by other de-
fendants in presenting their cases. The respondent's attorney, Mr. Galvin, stated
that "Pearson's case was the first to be decided under the immigration law passed
by Congress in 1996 and could set a precedent for the six other cases involving
former IRA men now pending in courts." Ronald Powers, The Clinton Administra-
tion Appealed a New York. Assoc. PRESS. POL. SERv., April 25, 1997.
77 See Pearson, at 34.
78 See id. at 32.
79 Id. at 34.
80 Id.
81 Alluding to the AEDPA and the IIRAIRA, see supra notes 3 and 4.
82 See Pearson, at 35.
83 Id. at 34.
84 Id.
85 Id. See also supra note 14 (information regarding the political nature of a
crime).
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military barracks used by the RUC and that "[g]overnment
property, as opposed to 'the indiscriminate bombing of a civilian
populace' was the target of said attack."8 6
In addition to finding that Pearson could not be deported
and was not a terrorist, Judge Williams granted him permission
to remain in the United States under two provisions of federal
immigration law.8 7 Under one provision Pearson was found to
be a refugee eligible for asylum as the court found Pearson had
a well-found fear of persecution for his political beliefs. 8 Thus,
the court granted Pearson asylum.8 9 The other provision was
that Pearson had married a U.S. citizen and had a U.S. citizen
daughter of "tender years."90 Thus, the court found Pearson eli-
gible for Adjustment of Status as the immediate relative of a
U.S. citizen.91
On April 25, 1997, the Service appealed Judge Williams'
decision granting the Respondent asylum.92 The appeal chal-
86 Pearson, at 34 (citing Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 894 (1981).
87 See INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994) (adjustment of status as the imme-
diate relative of a U.S. citizen); INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42(A)
(1994) (refugee with a well-founded fear of persecution for political beliefs).
88 See Pearson, at 39-41.
89 See id. at 43. Thus, Pearson could remain in the U.S. under temporary
status as an asylee. See 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a) (1998). See also supra note 27 for
information about asylee status.
90 See Pearson, at 38.
91 See id. See supra note 50 regarding standard for hardship. Although
Judge Williams did not refer to the statutory standard for hardship, it seems clear
that Judge Williams, in finding Pearson eligible for Adjustment of Status, did look
at the 'extreme and unusual hardship' to the respondent's wife and daughter were
they to live in Ireland with the respondent. Mrs. Pearson testified that the Re-
spondent is a good husband and has an extremely close relationship with his
young daughter. See id. at 17. Judge Williams noted that Doris Pearson had testi-
fied that after the family tragedies she has endured (her adult son was murdered
and her mother had recently undergone brain surgery) she would have a "nervous
breakdown" if her husband had to leave the country. Id. at 17. She also testified
that she was unsure she would leave the country with the Respondent if he were
forced to leave, stating "I do not think I should have to make that decision-I have
been a model citizen." Id. Judge Williams did note that Mrs. Pearson works as a
computer administrator earning $50,000 a year, that she and the Respondent
jointly own a home, and that her family is in New York, including an adult daugh-
ter from her first marriage. See id. Furthermore, Mrs. Pearson testified she was
afraid to go to either Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland based on the
accounts she has heard of attacks on people there. See Pearson, at 17.
92 See John W. Barry, Political Asylum? IRA Man Would be Sent Back, VIL-
LAGE VOICE, July 1, 1997, at 26. The Service's appeal barely met the 30-day win-
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lenged the finding that Pearson's convictions were political
rather than criminal, disputed that Pearson had a well-founded
fear of persecution if deported and whether he had engaged in
terrorist activities. 93 However, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, succumbing to political pressure regarding Sinn Fein's
participation in the Stormont Peace Talks, 94 intervened95 and
Attorney General Janet Reno suspended Pearson's appeal pro-
ceedings. 96 Reno also suspended deportation proceedings
against several other former IRA members requesting asylum
in the United States.97
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Asylum
The court held that the Respondent met the initial three
elements to show that he was a refugee and therefore eligible
for asylum. 98 The Respondent clearly met the first element as
he filed for asylum outside his country of nationality.99 The sec-
ond element has two components which the applicant must
demonstrate: 1) inability or unwillingness to return to the coun-
dow allowed by law by which to appeal. See supra note 74 for a discussion of the
procedural process by Which to file an appeal with the Board.
93 See Tara Peterman, Pearson to Counter-Appeal INS, IRISH VOICE, May 6,
1997, at 7.
94 These all-party talks were headed by Senator Mitchell. See Balz, supra
note 65, at A15.
95 See Burrell, supra note 75. Attorney General Janet Reno acted at the re-
quest of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who said suspension of the pro-
ceedings would advance the peace process in Northern Ireland. See id. Albright's
letter to Reno detailing her request stated:
We do not approve or condone any past acts of terrorism in which
they may have been involved . . . nor do we accept the legal arguments
against deportation that have been advanced in some of their cases. But,
in light of our interest in achieving a lasting, overall settlement in North-
ern Ireland, we request that as a matter of discretion and without preju-
dice to the administration's legal position, you take action ... to ensure
that these individuals will not be deported from the United States at this
time.
Id.
96 See Susan Benkelman, Reno Suspending IRA Deportations/Move Made to
'Advance the Peace', NEWSDAY, September 10, 1997, at A15.
97 See Burrell, supra note 75. See also supra note 75 for information on these
individuals.
98 See Pearson, at 39-43; see also supra Section II for a discussion of refugee
eligibility.
99 See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994).
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try of nationality because of past persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution; and 2) inability or unwillingness of the
country of nationality to protect the alien from possible persecu-
tion. 100 Respondent met the first component, as he demon-
strated an inability or unwillingness to return to either
Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland. 1 10 Judge Williams
found the Respondent met the second component as the Respon-
dent had established a well-founded fear of persecution if re-
moved to either Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland. l02
Judge Williams also determined that the Respondent met the
third component since he "established that the British govern-
ment is unwilling or unable to prevent possible persecution, and
that the persecutors have the capability of striking at the
Respondent."10 3
1. Well-founded Fear of Persecution
Changed conditions in the country designated for de-
portability can affect the reasonableness of an alien's well-
founded fear of persecution. 0 4 Such changed conditions are
also grounds on which a move to reopen a case with the BIA
may be based. 105 Respondent's own expert witness, Sean
100 See supra note 99.
101 See generally Pearson, at 39-42.
102 See id. at 41. However, as a criminal prosecution is not persecution (see
supra note 19), Judge Williams did not find the Respondent had suffered past per-
secution. See id. at 39.
103 Pearson, at 40. The court relied upon expert testimony detailing the prac-
tice of "collusion" between the authorities and Loyalist groups to show that Loyal-
ist groups are or can easily become aware of the Respondent's acts, and thereby
making him an immediate target. See id. The court also cited to the HELSINKI
WATCH REPORT, HuMAN RIGHTS IN IRELAND, p. 49 [hereinafter HELSINKI REPORT]
detailing the collusion between security forces and paramilitary forces involved in
the "shoot-to-kill" policy of suspected terrorists. See Pearson, at 40. Judge Wil-
liams clarified that he could not state the British government is unwilling to pre-
vent attacks on Catholic Republicans, but noted that "the previous 25 years are
replete with examples of how the government is unable to prevent such attacks."
Id.
104 See In re H-, Int. Dec. 3276 (B.I.A. 1996). See also INA § 208(a)(2)(D), 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (Supp. II 1996).
105 See In re L-O-G-, Int. Dec. 3281 (B.I.A. 1996); In re E-P-, Int. Dec. 3311
(B.I.A. 1997). The BIA has authority to conduct an independent review of the rec-
ord, and of the exercise of discretion in granting asylum. See In re H-M-, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 683, 688 (B.I.A. 1993). "The Board is not bound by the immigration judge's
conclusions but rather has plenary power to review the record de novo and to make
23
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Cronin, self-admitted former Chief of Staff of the IRA for sev-
eral years, testified that he has never had any trouble upon his
visits to Ireland within the past 10 years.'0 6 It is more than
likely the Loyalist groups knew of Cronin's past elevated posi-
tion within the IRA and also of his comings and goings to Ire-
land; yet Cronin did not testify as to any 'persecution' during his
many visits. The court relied heavily on the Helsinki Watch Re-
port, Human Rights in Ireland, which detailed that between
1969-1989 there were 329 deaths associated with political un-
rest, with over one-half being civilians with no known connec-
tions to paramilitary groups, and a disproportionate amount
being Catholics and Republican paramilitaries.'0 7 However,
since that time, the IRA via its political branch, Sinn Fein, has
entered into several long-term cease-fires.' 0 8
Subsequently, Sinn Fein received further political recogni-
tion by being invited to participate in the all-party talks. 10 9
Sinn Fein agreed to participate, renunciating violence and com-
mitting to a democratic process for resolving the conflict. In-
deed, Sinn Fein agreed to support the: "'total disarmament' of
all paramilitary groups on both sides of the sectarian divide and
to abide by the terms of resolutions reached through the negoti-
ations and to not attempt to change them except through demo-
cratic means."1' 0 Thus, it is this writer's opinion that, were a
review of this case to take place, the circumstances would be
found sufficiently changed. Such change would support a find-
ing that the Respondent no longer has a well-founded fear of
its own independent determinations on questions of law and fact." Matter of Lok,
18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 106 (B.I.A. 1981).
106 See Pearson, at 24-25. Cronin estimated that he has spent 4-5 weeks in
Northern Ireland and approximately 20 weeks in the Republic of Ireland, all with-
out incident. See id. at 25.
107 See id. at 40. The court noted that the Helsinki Report indicated that "of
the 329 people killed between 1969 and 1989 ... 149 were Catholics while 25 were
Protestants." Id. at 41. "Additionally, the Helsinki Report notes that 123 of the
329 persons killed between 1969 and 1989 were Republican paramilitaries while
only 13 were Loyalist paramilitaries." Id. Note that these figures date back from
1989 and nothing more current was cited by the court.
108 There have been several long-term cease-fires negotiated between the IRA
and British authorities, such as the one renewed by the IRA on July 20, 1997. See
Balz, supra note 71, at A15.
109 See id.
110 Id.
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persecution and should be deported at least to the Republic of
Ireland, if not Northern Ireland."'
2. Persecution Based on Political Beliefs
The Respondent was found eligible for asylum based on his
political opinion.112 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the importance of establishing the nexus between the
political opinion of the applicant and the persecution; namely
establishing that the feared persecution is on account of the ap-
plicant's political opinion, rather than something else.'1 3 The
fact that a persecutor acts out of a "generalized 'political' mo-
tive" is not sufficient; the persecution must be based on the ap-
plicant's political views or perceived political views. 1 4 Here,
the Respondent "testified vehemently" that he never took an
oath of allegiance to the IRA, and was never sworn into the
IRA. 115 As such, the Respondent was not a member of the IRA.
111 Respondent's expert witness on the violations of civil and human rights in
Northern Ireland, Oliver Kearney, admitted that the RUC had prevented Protes-
tants from attacking civil rights protesters on certain occasions. See Pearson, at
21. Kearney also stated that he was unaware of any person deported to the Repub-
lic of Ireland who was killed by Loyalists. See id.
See also In re E-P-, Int. Dec. 3311 (B.I.A. 1997). The BIA denied asylum to an
Haitian woman, who claimed persecution by the Haitian military based on her
church membership and support of Father Aristide. Even though members of the
woman's family were killed by the military as they left their church, the BIA found
conditions in Haiti substantially changed. See id. The Board stated it was not con-
cluding Haiti was an untroubled country, but that the rise to power by democratic
forces and the significant efforts made to dismantle the former military structures
have a direct impact on asylum claims of Haitian refugees. See id. The Board
further held that her claim was based on her status as a member of the general
public who supported President Aristide, and therefore the Board did not find ade-
quate evidence to support a finding of past persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution. See id.
112 See Pearson, at 39-42.
113 See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (Board denied asylum to an
applicant who faced forced recruitment into anti-government guerrilla forces as
applicant had not shown his refusal to join the guerrillas was based on his own
political opinion, rather than on the persecutor's political opinion).
114 Id. at 482.
115 See Pearson, at 33, 35. The Respondent's expert witness Sean Cronin de-
scribed the IRA's practice of having volunteers make a "declaration" that they wish
to be in the IRA. See id. at 24. Cronin testified that "if a person does not make the
declaration, then he would not be considered a member, asserting that a person
does not become a member of the IRA merely through his actions." Id. The re-
spondent testifies his involvement only involved being asked, "Do you want to help
us out?" and "Like to do a run?" Id. at 33. It seems naive indeed to this writer to
25
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Thus, any persecution to which the Respondent would be vul-
nerable would not be because of his own beliefs (beyond the fact
that he is Roman Catholic, has the accent and mannerisms of
such, and believes in the unification of Ireland) but because of
the beliefs of his persecutors. 116
3. Political Offenses Exception
Even if the Respondent were to be found eligible for asylum
by meeting the three elements qualifying him as a refugee, his
prior criminal convictions could statutorily bar him from asy-
lum if deemed aggravated felonies 117 and crimes of moral turpi-
tude." 8  Were his crimes classified as such, the respondent
could avoid these bars if he were to fall under the political of-
fense exception to these bars." 9 Judge Williams determined
the Respondent fell within the political offenses exceptions for
each of these bars, and therefore did not pretermit the Respon-
dent's asylum application. 120 Judge Williams accomplished this
by applying an extradition doctrine' 2' to immigration law, and
think that the Respondent was not considered a member of this organization, as he
was part of two well-planned bombings. See Pearson, at 27. See also supra note 31
for more details of the Respondent's criminal convictions. In this writer's opinion,
it is unlikely that a clandestine, paramilitary group such as the IRA would allow
just anyone to "help out" in such a high-risk mission. This is especially true con-
sidering the number of people involved in these incidents (5 on at least one occa-
sion), the high risk of danger, the need for coordination of efforts, and concerns for
secrecy.
116 See supra note 111.
117 See INA §§ 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii),
(b)(2)(B)(i) (1998). See generally INA § 208(b)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2) (1998).
This bar deems the alien a danger to the U.S. community because of a final judg-
ment of conviction of a particularly serious crime. See INA § 208(b)(A)(ii), 8
U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1998). See also supra note 64 and accompanying text
regarding submission of the Respondent's Record of Convictions.
118 See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1996).
119 See INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (1994).
120 See Pearson, at 35.
121 See Pearson, at 28-29. Judge Williams compared the purposes of extradi-
tion treaties with the purposes of immigration laws. The former allows the surren-
der of an individual from one state for that person to face criminal prosecution for
an act allegedly committed, while the latter determines who should be allowed to
enter and/or remain in this country to live and work. He determined that since the
Respondent had already been duly convicted, served time and released for having
committed certain crimes that the purposes of extradition would not be met. See
id. at 28-29. Judge Williams then determined "[tihat is the context in which this
Court must consider the "political offense" exception and decide whether the Re-
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by further stretching the definition of a "purely" political of-
fense 1 22 to include common crimes. 12
3
Even if the Respondent's convictions did not statutorily bar
asylum, once persecution is established 124 they weigh signifi-
cantly as an adverse factor in the court's discretionary balanc-
ing.125  However, the Respondent introduced numerous
witnesses to attest to his good moral character. 126 He further
demonstrated his "exemplary conduct" during his presence in
the United States by showing he owns property, pays taxes, is
married with a child, has a good paying job, and has not been
involved in any criminal conduct in this country or had contin-
ued involvement with the IRA. 127 Judge Williams downplayed
the significance of the Respondent's criminal convictions, noting
that the Respondent's criminal convictions occurred over 21
years ago and that at the time of trial the Respondent had been
released from his sentence for 9 years.128 While Judge Williams
acknowledged that the Respondent had been illegally in this
county those 9 years, after outstaying the terms of the VWPP,
spondent, by virtue of his conviction abroad, should be barred from this country."
Id.
122 "Purely political offense" is only referenced in but not defined in the INA.
See INA §§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (a)(2)(B)
(1994). The Service urged the Court to apply the concept of "pure" political offense
because the INA sections referenced "purely political offense." See Pearson, at 29.
The Service contended that "pure" political offenses are acts aimed at the govern-
ment with none of the elements of ordinary crime and do not violate the rights of
individuals, and include such crimes as treason, sedition and espionage. See id. at
29-30. Judge Williams agreed with the Service's definition of "pure" political of-
fenses. See id. at 30. However, Judge Williams determined that "crimes of vio-
lence [aggravated felonies] and crimes involving moral turpitude do contain those
characteristics, and are generally considered "common crimes." Id. Judge Wil-
liams cited examples of crimes of moral turpitude, as determined by the Board,
including the willful setting of an explosive. See id. Crimes of violence, referred to
in INA § 101(h), are defined as (i) "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another," or (ii) a felony offense
that "involves a substantial risk that physical force ... may be used in the course
of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1994).
123 See Pearson, at 30-31.
124 See supra note 10 for establishment of persecution.
125 See Matter of Soleimani, Int. Dec. 3118 (B.I.A. 1989). See supra note 46
setting forth positive and adverse factors to be considered in discretionary
adjudications.
126 But see INA § 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8) (Supp. II 1996) (conviction of
an aggravated felony bars finding of good moral character).
127 See Pearson at 42.
128 Id.
27
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Judge Williams did not appear to give either of those adverse
factors much weight.129 In this writer's opinion, the Respon-
dent's criminal convictions should have been a mandatory bar
to asylum. 130 But even if the Respondent did not fall within the
mandatory denial, the adverse factors in combination with the
Respondent's criminal convictions should have been enough to
deny asylum.131
Assuming the Respondent had been granted asylum and
withholding of deportation, then the Respondent would then be
allowed to stay in the U.S.132 until there were changed country
129 See id.
130 Mandatory denials for applications made before April 1, 1997, such as the
Respondent's, are required pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c) (1998), if the alien had
been convicted of an aggravated felony (as defined in INA §101(a)(43)) or "ordered,
incited, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(E) (1998). "If the evidence indicates that one of
the above grounds apply to the applicant, he or she shall have the burden of prov-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she did not so act." 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(c)(2)(E)(ii) (1998).
131 "Unless otherwise prohibited in § 208.13(c), an immigration judge may
grant or deny asylum in the exercise of discretion to an applicant who qualifies as
a refugee under section 101(a)(42) of the Act [INA]." 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(a) (1998).
132 See supra note 27 and accompanying text regarding the temporary status of
asylum. Note that withholding of deportation only prohibits the removal of the
alien to the proposed country(ies) of removal. See 8 C.F.R. n 208.16(b) (1998).
Therefore, it is possible that such an alien could be deported (removed) to another
country willing to accept him, unless the alien applied for withholding of removal
to the new country and could also establish that more likely than not that this
would threaten his life or freedom. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1) (1998).
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conditions in the proposed removal country(ies) 133 or until our
law(s) changed.1 3 4
B. Adjustment of Status Claim
This form of relief was particularly important to the Re-
spondent, as being granted Adjustment of Status provided the
Respondent with the permanent right to legally remain in the
United States.135 Again, the weighing of adverse factors would
have included a significant emphasis on the Respondent's entry
into this country, his subsequent overstay, and his criminal con-
133 See INA § 208(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (Supp. II 1996). Following
22 months of negotiations between eight parties, the Stormont Talks resulted in a
peace agreement known as the "Good Friday Agreement" ("GFA"). See Lionel
Shriver, Northern Ireland's Fragile Assembly, WALL ST. J. EuR., June 30, 1998, at
10; Tom Squitieri, N. Ireland Tries Out Self-Rule Security Tight as Voters Pick
New Assembly, USA TODAY, June 26, 1998, at 11A. A referendum ratifying the
GFA was passed in May 1998 by 71 percent of voters in Northern Ireland and 94
percent in the Republic of Ireland. See Squitieri supra at llA. Peaceful elections
were held in June 1998, filling Northern Ireland's newly formed 108-member re-
gional assembly. See Shriver supra, at 10. "The assembly will sit at the center of
Northern Ireland's new political structure and return to the province a degree of
self-rule." Squitieri supra, at 11A. The assembly will "select a 12-member admin-
istration of Protestants and Catholics that oversees government departments and
cooperates formally with the Irish Republic." Id. "By 1999, the assembly will have
authority over all matters in the province except taxes, police, defense and foreign
affairs." Id. "[Aill the main armed guerrilla groups are represented through par-
ties in the election. The politicians will be allowed to stay in the assembly only if
the gunmen allied to them maintain their cease-fires and eventually turn over
their arms." Id. Thus, conditions in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland may be such that concern for the safety of the Respondent, and others like
him, may soon be moot.
Furthermore, on October 16, 1998, David Trimble and John Hume, leaders of
the largest Protestant and Catholics parties, respectively, were both awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts in bringing about the historic accord. See Doug
Mellgren, Irish Leaders Win Nobel / / Hume, Trimble Share Peace Prize, CHI.
SuN-TIMES, October 16, 1998, at 1. In this writer's opinion, this is another strong
indication of changed circumstances in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland.
134 Since the inception of the Pearson case, the INA has been subject to numer-
ous amendments and modifications. In 1997 alone there were seven overhauls to
the United States Code dealing with immigration (8 U.S.C.). Given how often im-
migration law, in all its incarnations, changes, it is conceivable that the applicable
law might change, and possibly even before country conditions. Also, the AEDPA
and the IIRAIRA have been attacked as unconstitutional on a variety of fronts,
including the retroactive date of applicability contained in each, and the changes
in allowable review of decisions, which may provoke lawmakers to further amend
those Acts. See supra notes 3 and 4.
135 See supra note 45.
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victions.136 Even if Pearson had been deemed as having en-
gaged in terrorist activity, 137 the Service would still have had to
show that there were reasonable grounds to find the Respon-
dent a risk to the safety of the United States. 138 Judge Wil-
liams found the Respondent and his witnesses credible, 139 and
since there were no reasonable grounds to find the Respondent
a danger to the U.S., Judge Williams easily bypassed the claim
of the Respondent having engaged in terrorist activity. 140 How-
ever, withholding of deportation and adjustment of status re-
quires a further step, namely the alien has to establish "that
removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to the alien's spouse, ... or child, who is a citizen of
the United States."1 41 Judge Williams found that the Respon-
dent's wife "relies on him for emotional and financial sup-
port"14 2 and in combination with the Respondent's other
equities, 143 found the Respondent merited for adjustment of sta-
tus in the exercise of discretion.144
136 See supra note 46 for positive and adverse factors.
137 See INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (Supp. II 1996) (acts of
terrorism as bar to asylum).
138 See supra note 16.
139 See Pearson, at 26. As the immigration judge has the advantage of observ-
ing the alien as he testifies, the Board ordinarily will not disturb an immigration
judge's finding concerning the credibility of a witness. See In re V-T-S-, Int. Dec.
3308 (B.I.A. 1997). Here, Judge Williams made an explicit credibility finding, so
this, likely, would not be disturbed.
140 See Pearson, at 37.
141 INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (Supp. II 1996)(emphasis
added). See also supra note 47.
142 See Pearson, at 38. See also supra notes 47 and 91 regarding the hardship
standard and applying the standard to the Respondent's wife.
143 See Pearson, at 38. See also supra note 73 for a listing of the Respondent's
other equities.
144 See Pearson, at 38. But see In re Mendez, Int. Dec. 3272 (B.I.A. 1996). The
Board did not find extreme and unusual hardship to grant suspension of deporta-
tion to a Mexican national who had served a suspended sentence of one year. This
was so even though he was the sole financial supporter of his two U.S. children, his
9 year-old stepson, and his U.S. wife of 8 years. See id. The respondent's wife
testified he had been a loving father and that the children were emotionally close
to him. See id. The respondent had other family ties in the U.S., including several
legal permanent resident siblings and his parents, all of whom were self-support-
ing. See id. Hardship was not found even though the respondent's wife received
psychiatric treatment for depression, had attempted suicide following initiation of
criminal charges against her husband, had not worked for four years, and had a
medical condition involving her spine and hips that precluded her from lifting
things. See Mendez, Int. Dec. 3272. Poor economic conditions in Mexico made it
636
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V. PARTISAN POLITICS AND POLITICAL PRESSURES
Clearly partisan U.S. politics were at play, both during and
after the Pearson trial. During the pendancy of the case, Re-
spondent Pearson, his wife, and their attorney, Mr. Galvin,1 45
were called before the Congressional Ad Hoc Committee for
Irish Affairs 146 to address deportation proceedings against the
Respondent and other individuals. 147 The two leading members
of the Committee, Congressmen Benjamin Gilman1 48 and Peter
clear the 40 year-old agricultural worker and mechanic respondent would probably
have trouble finding employment there, and also make it likely he would not be
able to afford to stay in contact with his U.S. children. See id. However, the Board
held that "financial difficulty or emotional disruption was not sufficient to grant
suspension." Id. Also, the Board balanced the respondent's equities with his ad-
verse factors. See id. Given the seriousness of his crime and lack of evidence of
rehabilitation, the respondent was denied suspension in the exercise of discretion.
See id.
By contrast, the Respondent's wife, Doris Pearson, is in good health, has a job
with a salary of $50,000 a year, owns a home (with the Respondent), and has fam-
ily in the area, including her mother and an adult child from her first marriage.
See Pearson, at 17. No mention is made in the record regarding the Respondent's
family ties, either in the U.S. or in either part of Ireland. The Respondent, a 45
year-old carpenter earns $70,000 per year. See id. at 17, 25. Neither he nor his
wife have significant medical conditions. See id. Judge Williams found that the
Respondent had a well-founded fear regarding return to either part of Ireland, and
this, taken in combination with the emotional and financial impact on the Respon-
dent's U.S. citizen wife and child, seems to be how the Judge determined extreme
and unusual hardship to merit the exercise of discretion. If the Board were to
review this case de novo and under the current 'exceptional and unusual hardship'
standard it is very possible the result would come out quite differently.
145 "Mr. Galvin is a co-founder of Noraid, which has raised money for the IRA
in the U.S. and has lobbied heavily for the cause of Irish unity." Stevenson, supra
note 32, at 8.
146 This special Congressional hearing was held in February 1997. See Pear-
son, at 22.
147 See id.
148 Congressman Gilman, who represents the 20th District in New York in the
United States House of Representatives, testified as a character witness for the
Respondent. See id. at 15, 22. At the time of the trial, he served as Chair of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, and as a senior member of the House Oversight
Committee. See id. at 22. Congressman Gilman also co-chaired an informal group
of Congressional members, the Irish Caucus, who research and explore mecha-
nisms to bring peace to Northern Ireland. See Pearson, at 14. Congressman
Gilman stated that "the Respondent lives within his Congressional District and
that he has met the Respondent on many occasions, having first met the Respon-
dent at an Irish-American dinner before the proceedings were initiated." Id. at 15.
It was Congressman Gilman's opinion that "the Respondent poses no threat or
danger to the security of the United States." Id. While Congressmen Gilman testi-
fied as to the interpretation of Congressional intent regarding the aggravated fel-
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King,149 also appeared as character witnesses on behalf of Re-
spondent Pearson at his trial. 150 Following these testimonials
at the Ad Hoc Committee, Committee members publicly excori-
ated the INS for pursuing former IRA prisoners and urged that
proceedings against them be dropped.151 As a result of that spe-
cial Congressional hearing, a letter was sent to President Clin-
ton asking him to intervene on behalf of the Respondent.
152
Although the congressional hearing had no legal weight, it
has been suggested that it would be naive to dismiss its political
influence.' 53 Documentation regarding the conditions in Ire-
land was requested by the court from the Department of State's
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, but was never
received.' 54 Needing information regarding the conditions in
ony definition, as amended by the IIRAIRA, Judge Williams made it clear that he
could not accept Gilman's interpretation as the binding interpretation of Congres-
sional intent. Instead, he would look to the plain meaning of the law and other
established means of statutory interpretation regarding the newly enacted the
IIRAIRA. See id.
149 Congressman King, who represents the 3rd District in Nassau County on
Long Island was at the time of the trial serving his third consecutive term in the
U.S. House of Representatives. See Top Ten Irish Americans of 1997, IR. AM.,
April 30, 1997, at 49. At the time of the trial, Congressman King served on the
Committee on International Relations and co-chaired of the Congressional Ad Hoc
Committee for Irish Affairs. See id. Congressman King testified on behalf of the
Respondent as a character witness, and stated that he had known the Respondent
for 4-5 years. See Pearson, at 22. Congressman King distinguished random acts of
terror aimed at civilian targets from attacks on non-civilian targets, and stated
that "the acts the Respondent committed do not change his view of the Respondent
as being of the highest moral character and known in the community for great
honesty." Id. His opinion was that the Respondent poses no threat to the safety or
security of this country. See id. Congressman King also testified about the effec-
tive date of provisions of IIRAIRA, but again Judge Williams made clear he would
not consider that testimony in rendering a decision on those issues. See Pearson,
at 22.
150 Id. at 14-15, 22.
151 See Stevenson, supra note 32, at 8.
152 See Pearson, at 22. Note that the Congressional hearing and the subse-
quent sending of the letter are all legally permissible.
153 See Stevenson, supra note 32, at 8. Following the ruling, twelve members
of Congress wrote to Attorney General Janet Reno urging her to use her discretion
and not file an appeal of Judge Williams' decision. See Darina Molloy, Good News
for Brian Pearson, IR. AM., June 30, 1997, at 15.
154 See Pearson, at 8. The Department of State is charged with offering a pro-
file of prevailing conditions in the country from which the applicant is seeking asy-
lum, and may provide more individualized comments at its option. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.11(a) (1998). However, the judge may request comments from the Depart-
ment of State. See id.
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Ireland in order to make his decision, the court allowed the Re-
spondent to introduce testimonials of various kinds, thus pro-
viding the Judge with the Respondent's version of life in
Ireland. 155 Numerous high profile character witnesses testified
on behalf of Pearson. Such witnesses encompassed many
realms: the political, 156 judicial, 5 7 literary,158 and the reli-
155 The Service could also have introduced evidence regarding country condi-
tions in either part of Ireland and, for reasons not stated in the record, did not do
SO.
156 Congressmen Benjamin Gilman and Peter King appeared as character wit-
nesses. See supra notes 148 and 149. Also, Sam Coleman, a New York State As-
semblyman from the 93rd District in the State of New York testified as a character
witness on behalf of the Respondent. See Pearson, at 14. Assemblyman Coleman
met the Respondent a year before the trial and "was the initiating sponsor of a
non-binding resolution in the New York State Assembly expressing support for the
Respondent in his bid to gain lawful immigration status in this country." Id. As-
semblyman Coleman testified the Assembly unanimously passed the resolution on
April 6, 1995. See id. Assemblyman Coleman also characterized the Respondent
as of the highest moral character, was an asset to the community and noted that
the Respondent was honored in the Pearl River, New York St. Patrick's Day
parade that year. See id. Assemblyman Coleman testified that he knew of the
Respondent's past activities with the IRA, but believed that the Respondent's acts
were political in nature and asserted that even the United Kingdom classified the
Respondent's acts as political. See id. Assemblyman Coleman stated that he
"would sponsor a similar resolution in support of Hamas, a terrorist Palestinian
organization, if that individual's circumstances were similar to the instant Respon-
dent's; however, [ ]he... testified that he would have more faith in an Israeli Court
than the court in which the Respondent was convicted in." Pearson, at 14.
157 Judge William Kelly, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New
York for the past 10 years, sits in Rockland County, the county where both he and
the Respondent live. See id. at 13. Judge Kelly testified that he had known the
Respondent for seven years. See id. Judge Kelly stated that he "held numerous
law enforcement positions in the Bronx, New York District Attorney's Office be-
tween 1969 and 1982, and from 1982-1987 as a Town Justice for the Town of
Clarkstown, New York." Id. at 13. Judge Kelly testified to the Respondent's excel-
lent moral character, stating that based upon the Judge's own personal knowledge
and experience in examining the character of individuals, he was convinced that
the Respondent poses no threat to the community or to the security of the United
States. See Pearson, at 13. Judge Kelly testified that he generally considers
crimes against law enforcement officers particularly "heinous." Id. Judge Kelly
reconciled the Respondent's conviction of crimes in Northern Ireland with his be-
lief that the Respondent's confessions were tortured out of him, and that "the acts
the Respondent committed were not 'garden variety', but rather must be examined
in the context of a long historical nationalist struggle for independence in the
North of Ireland." Id.
158 Oistin McBride testified on behalf of the Respondent, as an expert witness
as to the nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland. See Pearson, at 17. McBride, a
34-year old photo-journalist, stated that he had written articles under pseudonyms
for, and submitted photographs to all of the major Irish newspapers, as well as for
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major American newspapers and the BBC. See id. McBride had taken part in
prestigious photo-journalist exhibitions, including one at the U.S. Congress. See
id. at 18. This witness summarized for the court the history of the division of Ire-
land and how most Catholics in Northern Ireland are Republicans who seek to rid
Northern Ireland of British Rule, and how most Protestants are Loyalists, who
want Northern Ireland to remain a part of the United Kingdom. See id. McBride
stated it is "possible to discern between a Nationalist and a Loyalist by appear-
ance, schooling, accent and language used." Pearson, at 18. McBride further testi-
fied that in Northern Ireland the Catholics are the minority and Protestants the
majority. See id. McBride testified as to the discrimination that resulted from this
disparity. See id. McBride testified that on many occasions in the 1960s, Catholic
protesters in a civil rights movement, which sought to end employment, voting,
and housing discrimination and to protest British rule, were attacked by the RUC,
the British Army, and Loyalist groups. See id. McBride testified that such attacks
culminated in a January 1972 event in which 14 unarmed Catholic Republicans
were killed by British paratroopers in Northern Ireland (known as "Bloody Sun-
day"). See id. Thereafter, McBride stated that peaceful resolution gave way to use
of the Irish Republican Army to achieve the Republican's goals of ending British
rule and discrimination in Northern Ireland. See Pearson at 18.
McBride testified as to the Special Powers Act, "which was implemented [by
the British in an attempt to prevent terrorism, which allowed for arbitrary arrest,
searches [sic] and seizure." Id. McBride testified about "collusion," charging that
information on Republican individuals gathered by RUC or other British sources is
handed over to Loyalist groups, who then "target" those Republicans by seeking
them out and killing them. See id. at 19. McBride stated that from 1989-94, 13
Sinn Fein members were killed, and as these members had a history of being
abused and harassed before their ultimate deaths, McBride testified he believed
that they were 'targeted'. See id. From his personal experience, McBride testified
that his father was targeted and killed in 1972. See id. at 19. Furthermore, Mc-
Bride stated the same happened to his brother in 1974. See Pearson, at 19. Mc-
Bride testified that 'collusion' and 'targeting' of individuals continues to this day,
citing the case of a naturalized U.S. citizen who returned to Ireland. See id. Mc-
Bride testified that this individual, Liam Ryan, was told by the RUC that Loyalist
groups had information on him and that he would be killed. See id. According to
McBride, Ryan was assassinated in November of 1989, but the record does not
indicate whether that was in Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland. See
Pearson, at 19. McBride testified that "even if an investigation implicated a mem-
ber of the RUC or a Loyalist group [as being responsible for doing something to
Republicans], that the individual would not be prosecuted for such acts." Id.
McBride cited to the deaths of several individuals, whom he alleges were
killed because of family members being members of the IRA or Sinn Fein (the
political wing of the IRA). See id. at 19-20. Notably, McBride referenced the July
1994 death of a pregnant mother of 5, Kathleen O'Hagan, in an attack at her home
which McBride believed was intended to kill her husband. See id. at 19. McBride
believed that Mr. O'Hagan had been targeted by a Loyalist group, the Ulster Free-
dom Fighters, because of his past activities against the RUC. See Pearson, at 19.
While McBride testified that there were "similar incidents within 15 days of his
testimony in February, 1997," no specific names or locations of these attacks were
noted in the record. See id. McBride testified that the Respondent has reason to
fear returning to Northern Ireland, due to his appearance, the profile he has
gained from the INS proceedings, and his past links with the IRA; thus, McBride
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gious. 159 Sympathy factors played high in the Respondent's
choice of character witnesses. 160 Several witnesses, who quali-
fied as experts, had decidedly personal connections with the
IRA161 or the Republicans. 62
concluded that the Respondent would be targeted by Loyalists. See id. McBride
testified that attacks occur on Sinn Fein and IRA members (and their families)
even in the Republic of Ireland. See id. Therefore, McBride opined that the Re-
spondent would not be safe even there. See id. at 20. McBride also testified he
believed it reasonable for the Respondent to fear for the safety of his wife and
daughter were they to return to any part of Ireland. See Pearson, at 19.
McBride testified regarding his personal experience, namely that he is a Na-
tionalist but not a member of the IRA. See id. at 20. McBride testified that he had
been arrested on numerous occasions because of his work, held in prison, but never
charged for any crime. See id. at 19. McBride "also testified that due to his high
profile he has been attacked on several occasions, that he wears a bullet proof vest,
and does not own a car for fear of a bomb being placed in it." Id. at 19-20. McBride
testified that a "fellow journalist," Eddie Copeland, "very recently" had his leg
blown off by a bomb planted in his car. Id. at 20. Copeland had been injured when
a bomb exploded underneath his car outside his Northern Ireland home on Decem-
ber 22, 1996. See Toby Harnden, Army Woman Who Shot RUC Officer Will Not Be
Charged, DAILY TELEGRAPH LoNDON, February 2, 1998, at 02. However, he was
not just a "fellow journalist," but is a leading republican/IRA supporter known as
the "Irish Republican Party godfather." Lionel Shriver, Northern Ireland's Fragile
Peace, WALL ST. J., December 31, 1996, at 6 (emphasis added).
159 The Court received a "passionate plea" from Cardinal John O'Connor of
New York on the Respondent's behalf. Pearson, at 42. The cardinal expressed his
"concern for humanitarian reasons," and proffered a character reference for the
Respondent, opining Pearson "has led an upstanding life in the company of his
family." Id.
160 The Respondent called several Irish-American police officers. Especially
sympathetic was Steven McDonald, Detective 3rd grade, a 12 year veteran with
the New York City Police Department (NYPD), and "a quadriplegic as a result of
an incident which took place in 1986 while he was working as a plain clothes of-
ficer in Central Park, New York." Id. at 13. Detective McDonald testified he had
known the Respondent for three years and that while aware of the activities the
Respondent was convicted of, Detective McDonald stated that he never discussed
the incidents with the Respondent. See id. at 13-14. Detective McDonald's "duties
include representing the NYPD by speaking at schools and other venues spreading
a message of non-violence." Id. at 13. Detective McDonald claimed to be against
all violence. See Pearson, at 13.
The Respondent also called retired NYPD Assistant Chief and veteran of 37
years, Thomas Gallagher, as a character witness. See Pearson, at 16. Gallagher
testified he had known the Respondent and his family for years, seeing them so-
cially at family events and social gatherings, and attested to the Respondent's high
moral character. Id.
161 Sean Cronin, Respondent's expert on Irish Republicanism and the nature of
the conflict in Northern Ireland stated that he was the "Chief of Staff of the IRA
between 1956-31 [sic]." Id. at 24.
162 The Respondent's expert witness on the violations of civil and human rights
in Northern Ireland, Oliver Kearney, was at the time of trial "the Secretary Gen-
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Following Judge Williams' March 27, 1997 ruling, further
political pressures were exerted. During March and April, the
Justice Department was flooded with phone calls and letters in
support of Pearson.163 On March 31, 1997, 12 members of Con-
gress wrote to Attorney General Janet Reno, urging her to "use
[her] discretion and not challenge Judge Williams' decision,
which is consistent with the public safety goals of the INA and
furthers the administration's goals of promoting peace and rec-
onciliation in Northern Ireland."1 64 The mobilization of Irish-
American groups, members of Congress, the New York State
Assembly, and use of editorials in Irish-American newspapers
appealing to the President and the Attorney General not to ap-
peal Judge Williams' decision, pressured the Clinton Adminis-
tration into letting the asylum ruling stand. 65 At a foreign
affairs discussion in mid-April, 1997, Congressman Gilman
publicly appealed on Pearson's behalf to the President, the Sec-
retary of State, Madeleine Albright, and the National Security
Adviser, Sandy Berger.166
Then on April 25, 1997, the INS appealed the verdict, chal-
lenging the claim that Pearson's actions were political and that
he would suffer reprisals if deported. 67 Following more polit-
ical pressure, Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois re-
sponded in a May 23, 1997 letter to the 12 members of Congress
eral of 'Equality,' a group which works for the promotion of economic and social
justice, and the elimination of discrimination in Northern Ireland." Id. at 20. Ois-
tin McBride, the Respondent's expert witness as to the nature of the conflict in
Northern Ireland, testified that his father and brother were targeted by Loyalist
groups (those who wish Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom,
mostly Protestants) and were subsequently killed in 1972 and 1974, respectively.
See Pearson, at 18-19. See also supra note 158.
163 See Tara Peterman, Justice Dept. Backs INS Pearson Appeal, IRISH VOICE,
June 10,1997 at 3.
164 Darina Molloy, Good News for Brian Pearson, IRISH AMERICA, June 30,
1997, at 15. This letter was signed by three senators, Christopher Dodd (D-Conn),
Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) and Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), and nine members of the
House of Representatives, including Ben Gilman (R-NY), Peter King (R-NY), Tom
Manton (D-NY), Richard Neal (D-Mass.) and James Walsh (R-NY). See id. In the
letter they also asserted that the INS targeted Pearson and other Irish nationals
for their beliefs. See Tara Peterman, supra note 163, at 3. In the letter it was also
asserted that Pearson was not a public safety threat. See id.
165 See Joe Carroll, Decision This Week on Whether to Deport Ex-IRA Man,
IRISH TIMES, April 21, 1997, at 3.
166 See id.
167 See Peterman, supra note 163, at 3.
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that "serious criminal convictions, even after the sentence is
served, will preclude relief in many cases."168 He further stated
that in cases of less serious crimes the law does permit the "bal-
ancing of the conviction against other favorable factors in reach-
ing a determination."'169
VI. POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS: LEGAL AND POLITICAL
There are six other former IRA members in the U.S., fight-
ing similar deportation attempts by the Federal immigration
authorities. 170 All are currently on hold as Attorney General
Janet Reno suspended the proceedings on September 9, 1997,171
and the Service will not further pursue Pearson's appeal or
those cases for the indefinite future. 72 Reno's announcement
came as Sinn Fein announced in Belfast that it would embrace
the "Mitchell Principles," a six-point renunciation of violence
that was a prerequisite for the party's admission to the all-party
peace talks173 scheduled to begin in mid-September, 1997.174
"Hard cases, it is said, make bad law."' 7 5 Judge Williams'
decision is not entirely shocking, as the U.S. protects individual
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See supra note 75, discussing these other cases at length.
171 See Cassandra Burrell, Administration Stops Deportation Proceedings To
Further Peace Talks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, September 9, 1997. Note that Noel Gay-
nor and Gabriel Megahey had been turned down for asylum and ordered deported.
See Richard Willing, Ruling Gives Ex-IRA Bomber Hope of an American Dream,
USA TODAY, April 14, 1997, at O3A.
172 See Burrell, supra note 171. The language in Albright's letter requesting
action "without prejudice to the administration's legal position" and "to ensure that
these individuals will not be deported from the United States at this time" indi-
cates that these deportation cases are not at their final resting spot. Id. (emphasis
added). Thus, the U.S. government has reserved the right to take up these cases
again at a later date.
173 See Dan Balz, IRA's Political Arm Renounces Violence; Sinn Fein Move Sets
Stage for N. Ireland Peace Talks Monday; Unionists Remain Skeptical, WASH.
POST, September 10, 1997, at A15. Sinn Fein had been invited into the all-party
talks on September 1, 1997, after the new Labor Party government of Prime Minis-
ter Tony Blair concluded that the cease-fire announced by the IRA in July was
genuine. See id. The talks included nine other parties in Northern Ireland that
represent the Protestant majority and the Roman Catholic majority, plus the Brit-
ish and Irish governments. See id.
174 See Susan Benkelman, Reno Suspending IRA Deportations/Move Made to
'Advance the Peace', NEWSDAY, September 10, 1997, at A15.
175 Ex parte Long, 3 W.R. 19 (1854) decision by John Campbell, Lord Chief
Justice.
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rights with great vigor, and case-by-case adjudication is always
vulnerable to outside influences and sympathies. Here the Re-
spondent, a 45 year old married man with a U.S. citizen wife
and young child who depended on him, was a very sympathetic
character. His crime, if one ever deems to call it that, was com-
mitted years ago and he served his sentence in a notoriously
harsh prison in Northern Ireland, known commonly as "The
Maze."176
This decision seemed to proceed from sympathy rather
than law. It seems clear to this writer that the decision to stay
the appeal was definitely based on concern for a higher goal of
peace in Northern Ireland, and not on the law. Admittedly, con-
cerns for peace involving two countries should take precedence
over the concern of one person; however, neither of the coun-
tries-at-risk is governed by U.S. laws nor do the laws of those
countries govern U.S. citizens when in the U.S. While this
writer believes discretion is necessary in diplomacy, and when
allowed by statute or case law in judicial decisions, it should not
become the norm. For once an exception for discretion is first
made, where would the deluge end? Here, an exception was
made where a strong political branch of a powerful faction in
Northern Ireland, a country with whom America has strong
ties, used its threat of non-participation in peace talks as lever-
age to have the U.S. relinquish its claims.
In this author's opinion, it is likely that Sinn Fein would
have participated in the peace talks regardless of the interven-
176 The official name is the Maze Prison, formerly known as Long Kesh Prison,
located near Lisborn, about ten miles from Belfast, Northern Ireland. See PADRAIG
O'MALLEY, THE UNCML WARS: IRELAND TODAY 264 (1983). Richard Harvey, Re-
spondent's expert witness on "special category status" [hereinafter SCSI, testified
that SCS was instituted by Lord Whitehall, the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, in exchange for a cease-fire, in 1972. See Pearson, at 22-23. Harvey testi-
fied that "SCS prisoners still served their time in prison, but in a different fashion,
which included better living conditions. Specifically, SCS prisoners did not wear
prison uniforms." Id. at 23. Harvey testified that when special category status
was abolished as of March 1, 1976, those prisoners incarcerated prior to that date
retained their status. See id. Harvey stated that he believed the Respondent was
a SCS prisoner for his April 1977 conviction of crimes relating to two separate
bombing incidents in Northern Ireland. See id. Harvey conceded on cross-exami-
nation that the statutes under which the Respondent had been convicted were
criminal statutes. See id. Harvey "further conceded that the British never used
the term 'prisoner of war' or 'political prisoner' when referring to SCS prisoners."
Pearson, at 23.
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tion of the Secretary of State and subsequent decision of the
U.S. Attorney General to stay the appeal of Pearson's and other
cases. Sinn Fein saw a moment by which to gain another ad-
vantage, and took it. While the capitulation on the part of the
U.S. may in the grand scheme be minor, as it involves only 6
individuals; there are many other cases which do not enjoy
political influence or media attention. Their claims for asylum
and/or withholding of deportation, based on changes in the
AEDPA and IIRAIRA, will be subject to the full statutory inter-
pretation of the law. At moments like these, it seems to this
writer that justice is for sale. Justice in this instance appears to
be a question of whom one knows and what influence can be
exerted in order to circumvent the law, which was intended to
apply equally towards all.
Judges should "administer justice according to law. Justice
in a larger sense, justice according to morality, is for Congress
and the President to administer, if they see fit, through the cre-
ation of a new law."177 If every judge were to decide each case
according to what that judge thought to be fair or just, without
regard to the law, then certainly judicial anarchy would result.
However one may view Judge Williams' decision, the deci-
sion by the Attorney General to forego appeal of this case was
very clearly politically motivated. 178 Partisan politics played a
significant role throughout this case. Political pressures contin-
ued even after this decision was rendered. That prevailing
political attitudes affect the judicial and administrative func-
tions of government is an unavoidable reality.1 79 However, it
should not, in this author's opinion, be the guiding force.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that "[t]he life of law
has not been logic: it has been experience.' 80 As he explained,
"[t]he law embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained
177 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA-THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAw 6 (1989).
178 U.S. officials themselves described the decision to suspend the deportation
proceedings as a gesture to encourage the peace process in Northern Ireland. See
Balz, supra note 173, at A15.
179 See Jonathan Stevenson, The IRA Doesn't Deserve Asylum, WALL ST. J.
EUR., May 21, 1997, at 8.
180 OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics." 8 1
The trend of the Board of Immigration Appeals, in recent deci-
sions toward application of the refugee standard, reflects the
complex political and social situations in the world today. l8 2
The most notable factors the BIA looks at to determine
whether the applicant suffered due to motivation by an actual
or imputed political opinion, include: whether anti-terrorism
laws were being used to suppress political opinion and whether
political opponents were being subjected to arbitrary arrest,
prosecution, detention or mistreatment. 8 3 It could be that with
the BIA's retreat from the past narrow decisions limiting asy-
lum eligibility that Pearson would be upheld on appeal. 184
181 Id.
182 See In re H-, Int. Dec. 3276 (B.I.A. 1996) (asylum applicant who demon-
strated past persecution need not only demonstrate compelling reasons for being
unwilling to return to his or her country of nationality; need only arises if the
presumption of future persecution is rebutted by a demonstration that the condi-
tions in the country of nationality have changed to such an extent that a future
fear of persecution is not reasonable). See In Matter of S-P-, Int. Dec. 3287
(B.I.A. 1996) (asylum applicant established eligibility by demonstrating past per-
secution for imputed reasons; Board recognized persecutors may have a mix of
motivations for engaging in persecution). See also Terry J. Helbush, New Develop-
ments in Asylum 1996, 964 PLI/CoRP. 59 (1996).
183 See Helbush, supra note 182, at 61. See also In Matter of S-P-, Int. Dec.
3287 (political opinion can also be imputed).
184 "The Board has retreated from its earlier decisions and 'reaffirms' that an
applicant can establish asylum eligibility by demonstrating past persecution for
imputed reasons, including imputed political opinion." Helbush, supra note 182,
at 62. The doctrine of imputed political opinion allows applicants to qualify for
asylum based on past persecution or future persecution they fear on account of
political opinion which has been or will be imputed to them by their persecutors,
usually governmental agents. See id. at 61-62; see also Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS,
777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985). Until 1996 and In Matter of S-P-, the BIA had
been reluctant to apply the doctrine to situations of internal conflicts. The BIA
found that the persecutors were not motivated by any political opinion ascribed to
the applicants, but by the government's legitimate need to investigate and obtain
information related to terrorist activity. See In Matter of S-P-, Int. Dec. 3287
(BIA found a Sri Lankan Tamil applicant to be persecuted at least in part because
he was believed to be a member of an alleged terrorist organization, the Liberation
Tigers). See also Helbush, supra note 186, at 62; In re H-, Int. Dec. 3276 (B.I.A.
1996) (BIA found persecution in the context of an ethnic civil war on account of
membership in a particular social group, the Marehan subclan of the Darood clan
in Somalia). "[Wihile interclan violence may fall within general category of civil
strife, that does not preclude certain acts from being persecutory and does not
change the fact that certain types of harm constitute persecution." In re H--, at 11.
See also Matter of Villata, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142 (B.I.A. 1990) (Board found a well-
founded fear of harm from paramilitary groups on account of political affiliation).
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However, the BIA conforms to statutory amendments regarding
new definitions of crimes of violence, namely an aggravated fel-
ony.18 5 Within In re Yeung, the BIA stated that "[n]othing could
be more clear than Congress' desire in recent years to limit,
rather than extend, the relief available to aliens who have been
convicted of crimes."' 8 6 "Congress voted overwhelmingly for the
recent legislative changes to immigration law and sent a clear
message of zero tolerance to those who violate the immigration
laws.' 8 7 This power has been recognized repeatedly by the
Supreme Court.' 8 8
VII. CONCLUSION
In pursuing this case, the INS was fulfilling its responsibili-
ties as dictated by changes in immigration law pursuant to the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility
Act 18 9 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act. 190 It is argued that the court can judge and develop proce-
dural mechanisms by which Congress' immigration policy is im-
plemented, 191 in accordance with the development of Congress'
plenary power. 192 However, the court's role is confined to en-
suring that "procedures meet the essential standard of fairness
under the Due Process Clause and do not extend to imposing
procedures that merely displace congressional choices of
policy."193
185 See Helbush, supra note 182, at 66.
186 In re Yeung, Int. Dec. 3297.
187 Carol Leslie Wolchok, Demands and Anxiety: The Effects of the New Immi-
gration Law, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 12, 13 (1997). "The House Immigration Subcommit-
tee has launched an aggressive schedule of oversight hearings to drive home the
point that it is monitoring the INS closely and expects the agency to 'fully execute
the will of Congress."' Id.
188 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Reno v. Flores 507 U.S. 292
(1993). See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). "[The Supreme]
Court without exception has sustained Congress' 'plenary power to make rules for
the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics
which Congress, has forbidden.'" Id.
189 See IIRAIRA, supra note 4.
190 See AEDPA, supra note 3.
191 See Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret
Deportation Proceedings, 7 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 23, 24 (1996).
192 See supra note 188 (citing to cases regarding Congress' plenary power rec-
ognized by the United States Supreme Court). But see Richard Boswell, Throwing
Away the Key: Limits on Plenary Power?, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 689 (1997).
193 Landon v. Plasenica, 459 U.S. 21, 35 (1982).
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It was within the Immigration Judge's discretion whether
or not to grant asylum. 194 However, without an appellate re-
view of Judge Williams' weighing of the various factors in
granting asylum 195 there is no check on this judicial process.
However, the lawmakers, the Senators and Congressmen, who
enacted the AEDPA and the IIRAIRA to reflect their constitu-
ent's views, may wish to make certain that their roles as
lawmakers have not been circumvented by the judiciary. 96
Otherwise Congressional intent inherent in statutory language
can be interpreted by the judiciary as only a posture and not a
position which must be followed. While statutory language can
never be exact, as it will be subject to interpretation and evolu-
tion throughout its lifetime, lawmakers can insure that their
constituents' views are accurately reflected by the judiciary in
careful phrasing of laws and in making clear their intention in
Legislative records. Here, it seems clear to this writer what
bars to asylum the Legislature intended in the AEDPA and the
IIRAIRA, but that political influence and partisan politics inter-
ceded to contravene such intentions.
April E. Schwendlert
194 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text discussing discretion of a
judge in an asylum case and various factors that play a part in that decision.
195 The BIA's review extends to the law, the facts, and the exercise of discre-
tion. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (1998). See also supra note 105 (regarding the
scope of the Board's review).
196 INS Spokesman Brian Jordan said the Service would abide by the Republi-
can-sponsored anti-terrorism law as enacted. See Ronald Powers, Lawmakers Call
on Administration to Block IRA Deportation, Assoc. PRESS POL. SERV., May 15,
1997. Jordan further stated that "[ilf there are concerns about that, then we re-
spectfully request Congress to make amendments to the anti-terrorism act." Id.
t 1999 J.D. Candidate, Pace University School of Law.
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